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The narrative has changed. It is no longer ‘Africa is rising’ but ‘Africa has risen’. 
Africa’s economic potential is being sung from all corners of the world. One would 
think that the continent would undergo another ‘scramble for Africa’ following on 
from this economic boom. However, it is also clear that all this growth and foreign 
investment into African development cannot be embraced in the absence of proper 
commercial institutional structures and policy guidelines in the areas of corporate 
governance. While these structures may already exist to some degree, the areas of 
greatest concern are those of enforcement and regulation. This dissertation therefore 
examines the case for strengthening the regulation and enforcement mechanisms of 
corporate governance in Africa using Zambia as a case study. After an analysis of the 
law and the institutional framework surrounding corporate governance in Zambia, it 
becomes evident that the current self-regulatory system is weak and inadequate in 
terms of ensuring compliance: this shortcoming ultimately makes its raison d’être 
futile. A method of comparative law will be used to evaluate other models of 
enforcement and regulation by internationally recognised corporate governance codes 
and legislation in the United Kingdom, United States of America, South Africa and 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
objective is to try to answer the questions of what measures work well and to what 
extent; this information is used to ascertain which model would be suitable for 
Zambia to address the problems of regulation and enforcement. It should be noted 
however from the outset that this paper does not advocate for a ‘copy and paste’ 
modus operandi in responding to the challenges of corporate governance in Zambia. 
There is no one formula to answer economic corporate governance issues but these 
policies which have been successful elsewhere can be used as a basis to create an 
organic formulae that would ultimately be suitable for Zambia, taking into account the 











Section I: INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, it is noted that self-regulation may be internationally acclaimed 
and may seem appealing with its hyperbolic connotations of ‘freedom.’ However, it is 
then argued that most African countries, and Zambia in particular, do not yet have a 
mature enough environment to entrust enforcement and regulation of the principles of 
corporate governance to the market. Zambia is a relatively small and young economy1 
and  is still assessing how it can encourage and also regulate the entry of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDIs) into the country; this can be done by having a good 
corporate governance framework in place that will maintain investor confidence while 
not deterring the investor with strict rules. This dissertation also argues that a 
mandatory regulatory framework enforced by law could yield a more effective result. 
Several example have been cited in an attempt to give a better picture of corporate 
governance on the continent and in Zambia in particular: these include Illovo, Zambia 
Sugar (South African FDI), Zambeef PLC and the general participation of Chinese 
investors in Zambia. While accepting that these FDIs are migrating to Zambia for 
profit, the country’s aim is also to benefit through sustainable development and to 
gain income from these investments. It is therefore important for Zambia to build 
strong policy regulatory frameworks in an effort to protect its own interests and to 
ensure accountability, transparency, responsibility, fairness and discipline in corporate 
transactions. This dissertation concludes by giving recommendations to Zambia by 
blending in some of the key features of the hybrid models; for example the OECD, 
UK, USA and SA Corporate Governance Codes; at the same time there is a very 
strong emphasis on the importance of effective ethical leadership and stakeholder 
inclusivity in relation to successful enforcement and regulation.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mwanamutanda, Ngoma, October 2013, ‘Zambia’s jobs challenge: The World Bank discusses 
realities on the ground, Issue 2.  
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/11/000442464_201310111
31704/Rendered/PDF/818160WP0P13230Box0379846B00PUBLIC0.pdf > accessed 1 March 2015. 
 
	  




1.1. BASIS FROM WHICH THE TOPIC HAS EVOLVED 
Corporate governance is currently one of the world’s most widely discussed issues. 
But what do we know about its composition and its origins? Is it a ‘system of checks 
and balances, to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory obligations, a risk 
management process, accountability to stake holders?’2 Or is it a ‘process of 
controlling management, taking into account interests of stakeholders, aim[ing] at 
ensuring responsible behaviour, [with the] ultimate goal to achieve maximum 
efficiency?’3  It is actually all of this. But, who are the stakeholders, employees, the 
community and the environment? What are the foundations of corporate governance? 
What is the importance of effective regulation and enforcement? These are the 
questions that section 1 aims to answer.  
 
There is no single and generally accepted definition of what constitutes the 
notion of ‘corporate governance.’ One pioneer and champion of corporate 
governance, Sir Adrian Cadbury, explains corporate governance as ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled.’4 Although later expanded, this 
definition did not initially refer to issues of company management. There are several 
definitions available for corporate governance as noted above; nonetheless, the 
definitions by Naidoo, Du Plessis et al., and Cadbury, quoted above, together give a 
solid starting point to unpacking this concept of corporate governance. To understand 
the origins of this concept further, historical landmarks of corporate governance 
cannot be ignored; therefore what follows is essentially the ‘Foundations of corporate 
governance’ from an historical point of view. A cumulative definition of corporate 
governance does not just require companies to behave responsibly and achieve a 
maximum level of efficiency and profitability, but also calls for companies to show 
characteristics of what is termed as ‘GOOD’ corporate governance. Lord Cadbury 
expanded on these characteristics of ‘Good’ corporate governance by including: 
discipline, transparency, independence (having different people on the board to give 
reports etc., independently), accountability, responsibility (e.g. who should have been 
responsible for the 2008 financial crisis) and fairness (e.g. what is ‘right’, what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ramani Naidoo, 2009, Corporate Governance, 2nd edn., Lexis Nexis: Durban 
3 Du Plessis, Hargovan, Bagaric, 2011, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance, 2nd edn, 2 
4 ibid 2 p 1 
	  






‘decent’ and what is ‘fair’)5. These are the characteristics and or philosophies on 
which corporate governance practice and guidance codes are built. The codes provide 
a structure, awareness and guidance in which all stakeholders need to operate if their 
corporates and states are to be successful. In order to understand these definitions 
further one must go back into history and look at the foundations of corporate 
governance and why it is important today. 
1.2. FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It is appropriate to start from the mid-1800s in London, which was then described as 
the financial powerhouse of the world6. The US at that time was described as a 
mining village whereas the United Kingdom was booming with economic 
globalisation and free trade7. This is important to note, especially when looking at the 
developments of the United Kingdom in the late 1800s such as the enactment of the 
basic financial act (Joint-Stock Companies Act of 1844); this Act improved the ability 
of people to invest in companies. The UK was clearly experiencing an industrial 
revolution and in order to keep this industrialisation going, labour and capital were 
needed. From this point, a schism in company ownership in the UK became more 
apparent. ‘Family owned businesses’ and companies started to change composition 
with the introduction of other shareholders and formalities on how companies would 
essentially be run from that time onwards (Jensen, 1993). The Joint-Stock Companies 
Act of 1844 provided no limited liability for shareholders8 but required directors to 
perform certain corporate governance functions such as: appointment of a chairman, 
holding meetings for board members, engaging auditors who were to report to the 
members and keeping accounting books. Limited liability was only introduced in the 
1855 Limited Liability Act. Nonetheless, company direction changed course and was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Muhammad Rafiq, 2012, ‘Impact of corporate governance on perceived organizational success 
(Empirical Study on Consumer Banks in Lahore, Pakistan),’ International Journal of Business and 
Social Science,  3, 13  
6 Cassis, Youssef, 2006, ‘Capitals of capital: A History of International Financial Centres, 1780-2005, 
1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
7 UK Parliament website, The Industrial Revolution < 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/parliamentary-archives/archives-highlights/industrial-
revolution/> accessed 2 March 2015 
8 Re Sea Fire and Life Assurance Co., Greenwood’s Case (1854) 3 De GM & G 459  
 
	  




expected to be effected by two primary bodies: ‘shareholders in general meeting’ and 
‘board of directors.’ There were a few checks and balances to control directors such 
as: the common law duties of care, skill and fiduciary duty of good faith, articles of 
association and statutory rules such as capital maintenance rules. However, in the 20th 
century, companies grew even bigger and their dispersed shareholding resulted in 
greater managerial authority, leading to a call for stricter corporate governance 
structures.9 
 
Furthermore, more stringent corporate governance structures and rules were 
enacted in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of scandals and 
corporate failures; for example the Robert Maxwell saga10 and Polly Peck11 scandals. 
These episodes led to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and accounting profession 
to commission a report by a committee led by Lord Cadbury on the financial aspects 
of corporate governance. In his book, ‘Cases in Corporate Governance’ Wearing 
notes that some of the recommendations in the Cadbury Report, which actually 
formed the genesis of corporate governance in the UK, were a direct response to the 
Maxwell case.12 For example, the first British Cadbury corporate governance report 
introduced by Sir Adrian Cadbury introduced the concept of auditing by focusing on 
three main components: firstly, the chairman of a company should be separate from 
the chief executive of a company; secondly, a company should have three non-
executive directors with no financial or personal affiliation to the executives. Thirdly, 
but most importantly, the Cadbury report took into account Robert Maxwell’s 
unmanaged and uncontrolled expenditure and duly indicated that audit committees 
must also be composed of non-executive directors.13  The recommendations of this 
and later reports have been implemented by the LSE as listing requirements. In South 
Africa, similar reports were instigated by the Institute of Directors; the King Report 
on corporate governance, led by Professor Mervyn King, was developed and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jensen, M.C., 1993, ‘The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems,’ The Journal of Finance, 48 (3), 831–840 
 
10 Robert Wearing, 2005, ‘Cases in Corporate Governance’ 1st edn, SAGE Publications Ltd,  38 
11 The Polly Peck scandal involved false production of financial reports submitted by Asil Nadir who 
was CEO of a British textile company named Polly Peck International; it collapsed in 1990 due to 
Nadir’s syphoning of company power on the basis that he had powers over-riding of the board. This is 
an example of another issue that the Cadbury Report aimed to address. 
12 ibid 9 
13 The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992 Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, 1st edn, Gee & Co Ltd 
	  






incorporated into the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirements. Thus 
placed South Africa in the forefront with one of the leading corporate governance 
codes in the world championing the importance of corporate governance.  
 
During the last two decades, the concept of corporate governance has come to 
the fore internationally, with countries such as the United States of America, 
Germany, Brazil and China emphasising it, while African countries such as Zambia 
have not been left behind. The Zambian Lusaka Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Code (LuSE Code) was launched in 2005 in conjunction with the 
Institute of Board Zambia (IoDZ), which was established in April 2000. These 
developments occurred after Zambia noticed the importance of the concerns that 
corporate governance principles aimed to tackle. The dynamic environment in which 
these companies and businesses operate consists of different stakeholders such as 
employees, consumers, the environment, the community at large as well as 
shareholders. Corporate governance has therefore had an effect on the world at large 
to the extent that the governance of companies is as important as the governance of a 
country; this will later be seen in discussion of the 2008 World economic crisis. It is 
through this type of world crisis that one sees the importance of, and the need for, 
effective enforcement and regulation of corporate governance in Zambia.  
1.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis saw the bailout of banking institutions by 
governments as an intervention to prevent a total collapse of financial institutions 
worldwide.14 This affected other sectors of the world economy such as the housing 
sector, banking sector and consumer goods markets. It had far reaching implications 
in which most investors lost their equity investments and also gave rise to new, hostile 
financial regulations. The value of investments was lost through a combination of 
speculation and holding on to toxic assets. Even more worrying was the fact that 
public investors held most of these investments but the corporations and the hedge 
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funders were also investing money irresponsibly even when they knew these 
investments were not sustainable and that they had a moral obligation to make 
responsible investments. Moreover, hedge fund institutional managers paid 
themselves exorbitant bonuses despite this obligation. In short, the management were 
over-rewarding themselves for their poor performance as well as ‘cutting corners.’ 
The wake of the collapse led to the financial crisis and as a result, regulation was 
further increased to address the problem of weak corporate governance.15 Also, 
governments have stepped in with more stringent structures to limit certain types of 
bank bonuses and the type of investment portfolios that can be devised by financial 
institutions.   
For example, in South Africa in 2015, the South African Minister of Finance, 
Nhlanhla Nene, was quoted in an article in the African Hedge Fund News website as 
emphasising that ‘the main objective of the hedge fund regulation is to protect 
investors and to assist with monitoring systemic risk, while promoting the integrity of 
the industry’.16  This scenario serves as a reminder of the importance of effective 
enforcement and regulation of corporate governance insofar as good governance tends 
to channel corporate decisions in the right direction and consequently encourages 
more investment by protecting the investor from managerial misbehaviour. The 
‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’ can be understood as referring to workable systems of 
governance that will ensure accountability, transparency, responsibility, fairness and 
discipline17 in both corporate and state institutions. Christophe Volonté, one of 
Switzerland’s renowned specialists in corporate governance underscores this point in 
his writing by stating that, “Good" corporate governance is believed to reduce the 
likelihood of bad or wrong management and, as a result, to create shareholder 
value.’18 This is exceedingly important especially with the rise of the modern 
corporation19 where there is need for clearer limits to be imposed on the exercise of 
power by companies; this was underlined by the financial crisis. Furthermore, 
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16 An article commenting on the strengthening of the financial investment guidelines in South Africa: 
‘Clarity on hedge fund regulation a boost for the industry,’ < 
http://www.hedgenewsafrica.com/page/reading-room/1649943-Clarity-on-hedge-fund-regulation-a-
boost-for-the-industry > accessed 2 March 2015  
17 ibid 5 
18 Volonté C., 2012, ‘Foundations of Corporate Governance,’ 6  
19 O’Kelley C., 2013,‘The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance in Context’  
	  






corporate governance is important as it makes good business sense to reap the benefits 
that arise from a workable corporate governance system.  
1.3.1. Access to capital 
According to the McKinsey Investor Opinion poll, investors are generally more 
prepared to pay a premium for good governance, showing that corporate governance 
is important for improving an institution’s chances of accessing capital20. 
1.3.2 Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) 
The legal and regulatory approach to corporate governance in a country can lead to 
higher FDI; however, this is debatable if one considers China in Africa. The presence 
of Chinese foreign direct investment can be looked at from two different angles: a 
positive angle and a negative one.  
Firstly, the positive angle is that China is attracted to the growth in business 
opportunities in Africa and the low tax policies that accompany it. Although this is a 
positive opportunity for African countries such as Zambia to earn foreign exchange 
through trade with China and to improve their economies, it can also be negative if 
African countries are offered a poor deal. For example, China has increased its 
investment portfolio on the continent which is evident by their increased presence on 
every aeroplane flight into and out of Africa. Thus, ‘China is now the largest single 
trading partner for sub-Saharan Africa’21 which is partly the result of offering cheap 
infrastructure construction deals to African governments in exchange for long-term, 
high-value assets in Africa such as land and mines and mineral royalties. The Chinese 
conduct road construction projects in exchange for gold, copper, diamonds, 
manganese and other unprocessed mineral ores, with very little value addition. This 
situation is very common on the continent, where the Chinese get a better bargain 
when one compares the value addition of the minerals extracted, against the value of 
roads that almost last a life time.22 This situation represents the negative angle.  
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One should not imagine that African governments are unable to negotiate a better 
deal for themselves and capitalise on the benefits from these developmental projects. 
However they are hampered by the lack of decent corporate governance systems, a 
lack of expertise in terms of the composition of the teams responsible for facilitating 
the transactions23 as well as a lack of checks and balances in the system. All these 
shortcomings allow for poor risk management, poor investment decisions and lack of 
responsible leadership; indeed, the leadership is easily influenced by bribery, fraud 
and exploitation to the benefit of those in power and in influential positions but at the 
expense of the masses. This leads to the third point: corruption can have serious cost 
implications on corporate governance. 
1.3.3 Corruption 
Corruption has serious cost implications and therefore the presence of effective 
regulations and enforcement mechanisms of corporate governance helps to curb the 
levels of corruption in business, especially on the African continent. Africa records a 
score of less than 50% regarding corruption. Zambia has a score of 38% and is ranked 
85th out of 175 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) and this borders on the zone of the most highly corrupt countries in the 
world24. Zambia would score higher by reducing corruption, promoting ethical 
leadership, having a strong and vocal civil society and by putting pressure on the 
allocators of capital in companies to demand that principles of corporate governance 
are upheld. These issues arise in responsible investing and in turn ensure 
accountability and responsibility to the employees, communities, consumers and 
environmental management concerns [stakeholders]. One of the main arguments this 
paper aims to advance is that of strengthening the legal and regulatory frameworks in 
order to ensure practice of good governance both in the public and private sector. 
However, it should be strongly noted that the introduction of more corporate 
governance legislation would not necessarily result in better corporate governance,  
given the rampant corruption on the continent. Therefore, the fight against corruption 
should be fundamental to the success of effective regulation and enforcement of 
corporate governance.    
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1.3.4 Investor Responsibility 
There is a growing global expectation that investors should take on a holistic 
approach as they invest: this entails taking into consideration the environmental, 
social and corporate governance impact that they may have in the communities where 
they operate; both a short- and long-term approach are needed. In South Africa, the 
Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA)25 in conjunction with the 
United Nations Principles of Responsible Investing (UNPRI) not only govern this 
sphere of responsible investing but also work as instruments to guide the behaviour of 
the investor and what is expected of them as far as corporate governance is concerned.  
 
Investment institutions such as hedge funds are responsible for ensuring that 
good governance is upheld in the companies and businesses in which they invest. 
There is also a need to have ‘pro-active shareholders’ who challenge the board and 
hold them accountable for ensuring that company policies actually achieve what they 
were intended for. This is important as it encourages companies to adhere to good 
corporate governance practices and responsible investing, resulting in a wider net-
effect on beneficiaries, from good governance.  
 
Shareholders and institutional investors need to enforce their rights and exert 
pressure using these rights, from two perspectives. Firstly, they should be pro-active 
shareholders and ask the right questions. Secondly, they can be influential by virtue of 
their positions on boards and through the legal framework by ensuring that 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues are tabled and taken 
into consideration as part of their business strategies. The UNPRIs, which were 
established in 2006, encourage collaboration amongst investors26 enabling them to 
have a consensus approach on incorporating corporate governance principles and 
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practices and effectively implementing these principles [UNPRI Principle 527] in the 
transactions. 
 
It is for this reason that South Africa produced the ‘Code for Responsible 
Investing in South Africa’ (CRISA) as a mechanism to guide the behaviour of 
investors and capital allocators; this was in addition to the main corporate governance 
codes. Some have argued however, that it is not ideal to have two separate codes: 
CRISA and the Corporate Governance King Report; in this situation, the more 
important of the two would be CRISA. Others have argued that both codes are unique 
in the sense that they do not have the same exact purpose; thus, CRISA is very 
specific on issues of responsible investing. This is a point at which the corporate 
governance commenter and business financial journalist, Ann Crotty, underscores the 
importance of keeping CRISA and the corporate governance report separate, because 
of their distinct purposes28. 
1.3.5 Accountability  
Public campaign movements in the recent past have demanded more ‘accountability’ 
from corporations, to ensure a more informed public and more accountable 
corporations. One of the fundamental requisites of good corporate governance is 
accountability to stakeholders. An example of this is of Nestlé, whose baby milk 
products have, over the years, been marred with ‘Baby Killer’ allegations in global 
campaigns. Even South African consumers have taken part by threatening a boycott 
of its products in an accusation that they are ‘causing infant illnesses and death in 
poor communities by promoting bottle feeding and discouraging breast feeding.’29 
The consumer in this case demands accountability from the producing company 
which is responsible not only to the consumer but also to the community, the 
employees, the environment and the shareholders, who entrust Nestle to invest their 
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money. Therefore in the event of any problems or misfortunes or even praises, the 
company should be the first point of call as far as accountability is concerned.  
1.3.6 Competitive advantage 
Corporate governance is important because it encourages and ensures that players in 
the economic market adhere to good business practices, and to environmental, social 
and governance issues. It also maximises a company’s competitive advantage as 
investors tend to look at investing in companies that are aware of corporate 
governance issues and which abide by these good business practices. Therefore, a 
company exhibiting good corporate governance has a competitive advantage over a 
less adherent competitor in the same field as adherence to good practices improves the 
company’s image and consequently its performance.  
1.4. OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
To begin with, corporate governance can be understood to deal with shareholders’ 
expectations of a particular company or business. Moreover, it can and should be 
approached from a much broader sense of an ‘inclusive stakeholder’ approach of 
satisfying expectations of the various groups involved; this approach is supported and 
promoted by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. While definitions may 
vary, stakeholders in corporate governance include employees, shareholders, 
management, creditors, suppliers, the environment, the local community and even 
future generations.30 One could argue that these stakeholders share a common risk, 
(i.e. the possibility of gaining benefits or suffering harm) as a result of the activities of 
the company in question. The difference between the two approaches is attributable to 
the tradition and culture in a particular jurisdiction. For example, in the United States 
and the United Kingdom the emphasis is on the relationship between shareholders and 
management, whereas in France or Germany a company is viewed as a partnership 
between capital and labour, providing for worker representation at board level.31 In 
Zambia however, the corporate governance emphasis is mostly on shareholder 
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protection. A brief comparison of these jurisdictions is given, then discussed, in 
section IV of this paper. Nonetheless, it is important to understand and define in some 
detail who the various ‘stakeholders’ are. 
 
As denoted above, stakeholders in corporate governance are considered to 
include shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers and the community at large. 
These stakeholders and their roles in corporate governance are described, below, in no 
order of preference or hierarchy.  
 
Firstly, shareholders are providers of capital and their status is enshrined in 
the company legislation. Secondly, employees (workers) have interests in job safety 
and income; they can also participate in management in the workplace or on the board 
of directors, where they could act as shareholders if they benefit from share incentive 
schemes. The workers’ interest in training and skills development is one element of 
their interests promoted by corporate governance. This interest is also protected by 
legislation such as section 203 (4) of the South African Labour Relations Act that 
states: ‘A Code of Good Practice issued in terms of this section may provide that the 
code must be taken into account in applying or interpreting any employment law.’32 
Thirdly, creditors or providers of credit such as banks need to be sure that loans 
would be repaid and likewise, suppliers also want assurance they would be paid; these 
expectations are protected by legislation in most cases, under the Insolvency Acts and 
Credit Acts. Furthermore, consumers and the community  might be dependent on 
particular products or services and therefore the issues of sustainability and the impact 
on the environment may arise through boycotts or through legislation enshrined in 
acts such as the Consumer Protection and Environmental Acts.  
 
It is clear that there is a web of legislation addressing corporate governance 
issues. However, the enactment of large amounts of legislation is not, in itself, the 
solution for ensuring sound corporate governance practices and principles.  There is 
also a need for effective regulation and enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure 
maximum compliance by all participants, leading to a better society. This is the issue 
that this dissertation will discuss. Compliance can be realised by having an inclusive 
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stakeholder approach, as defined above, and involving stakeholders in regulation and 
enforcement, as will be seen in the ensuing sections of his report. 
1.5. CONCLUSION  
There is no single formula for addressing corporate governance issues.  The history 
and background of the concept of corporate governance stems originally from 
developed countries; nevertheless, developing countries such as Zambia are trying to 
incorporate this concept in their business practices. This situation is one of the main 
challenges for effective corporate governance and therefore a ‘copy-paste’ mechanism 
will not suffice for developing countries. This notion of corporate governance affects 
us all globally and in various ways: this applies to both the developed and the 
developing countries, as well as to the public and private business sectors. The 
commentator Benjamin Mulili elaborates on this point by stating that ‘there is [a] 
need for developing countries to develop their own corporate governance models that 
consider the cultural, political and technological conditions found in each country.’33  
From this perspective it can be seen that internationally recognised portions of 
corporate governance codes and legislation should only be used as guidelines or 
benchmarks in order to formulate unique codes specific to the dynamics and 
uniqueness of a particular state; they should not necessarily be regarded as the 
‘perfect model.’ For effective regulation and enforcement to be achieved, all 
stakeholders and dimensions of culture, customs, tradition, politics, economics and 
the rule of law have to be taken into consideration in the construction of a corporate 
governance policy. In essence, the question this dissertation seeks to answer is: how 
can African countries, using Zambia as a case study, fashion their corporate 
governance policies that inspire effective enforcement and regulation structures?  
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SECTION II: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This section discusses the main developments in corporate governance in Zambia 
between 1964 and 2015. For purposes of discussion, the section is demarcated into 
five main periods, which are synonymous with a particular political dispensation: thee 
are the Kaunda, Chiluba, Mwanawasa, Banda and Sata eras. 
2.2. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
When we examine the metamorphoses of corporate governance in Zambia, since the 
inception of the IoDZ in 2000 and the introduction of the LUSE Code in 2005, it 
becomes clear that there has been very little transformation in corporate governance 
in the past decade. This is even though the country has experienced unprecedented 
economic growth and transformation that has seen the need for proper corporate 
governance to be of paramount importance. This chapter proceeds from a simple 
analysis of economic growth in Zambia in the last five decades and uses the Zambian 
political progression as a guide. The chapter then discusses the five political 
governments since independence (1964) to date (2015) and looks at how each era has 
contributed to the development of corporate governance in Zambia.  
2.2.1. The Kaunda Era (1964 -1991) 
Corporate governance in the first three decades of post-independence Zambia was 
characterised by two main events: the formation of state-owned enterprise boards, and 
the enactment of the leadership code34.   
 
The post-independence leadership held the view that the economic benefits of 
independence were not cascading quickly enough to the majority of its citizenry. As 
such, the Government of the Republic of Zambia under the leadership of Kenneth 
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Kaunda decided to nationalise the economy by assuming 51 per cent35 ownership of 
all existing businesses, and equitably dividing the benefits of economic 
development36. In most instances, the government bought mining, manufacturing and 
banking companies, which they did not even have the expertise to run. Importantly, 
the Kaunda Administration introduced two state institutions, the Finance and 
Development Corporation (FINDECO), and the Mining and Industrial Development 
Corporation (MINDECO) to oversee the activities of the newly acquired enterprises. 
Contrary to the best practices of corporate governance, the Board of Directors of these 
two institutions and newly nationalised enterprises was chaired by the Republican 
President.37 By doing so, the government was acting as referee and player at the same 
time38. Even in the financial services sector, it was exceedingly difficult to regulate 
and operate the numerous nationalised banks. This not only blurred the reporting 
channels in state-owned enterprises but also made it more difficult to eradicate the 
wonton abuse of state-owned enterprises several generations later.    
 
In addition to setting up FINDECO and MINDECO, which were later 
reorganised into the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) and the Zambia 
Mining and Investments Corporation (ZIMCO), the Kaunda Administration put in 
place a Leadership Code which restricted a firm’s profits to a government stipulated 
amount. The Code was established to prevent people from becoming overly wealthy 
and was also intended to discourage private enterprises from exploiting the citizenry 
excessively. More specifically, the Leadership Code prescribed that all company 
profits in excess of K500, 000 were forfeited to the central government. A Leadership 
committee was set up to provide ‘for a Tribunal to deal with breaches and alleged 
breaches of the code.’39 This capping of company profits diminished the incentive for 
the few remaining private companies to grow. At the individual level, it indirectly 
promoted an attitude of laziness, as private citizens no longer saw the need to venture 
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out and participate in the business sector.40  The reasoning behind this Code was to 
have everything under state control, which in hindsight was a severe impediment to 
corporate governance. 
 
Collectively these initiatives, such as the formation of state-owned enterprise 
boards, and the enactment of the Leadership Code, severely undermined the 
institution of good corporate governance practices in Zambia. 
2.2.2 The Chiluba Era (1991-2001) 
The Chiluba regime was characterised by a surge in the number of privately owned 
corporations, following the implementation of an ambitious and wholesale 
privatisation programme in Zambia. During this time there was a relatively low level 
of knowledge of good corporate governance practices.  
 
Many of the state-owned entities in INDECO and ZIMCO underperformed 
because of bad corporate governance procedures. Following advice given by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, in particular the World Bank, the Government of the 
Republic of Zambia transferred most of the nationalised companies back into private 
hands through the mechanism of privatisation. As a precursor to the privatisation 
programme, Dr. Fredrick Chiluba, Zambia’s second Republican President, dismantled 
the Leadership Code left by his predecessor in an attempt to attract increased private 
sector investment. Consequently, the 1990s saw a surge in both the volume of private 
investment and number of privately owned companies in Zambia. In the absence of 
proper corporate governance guidelines, several businesses in the mining, 
manufacturing and banking sectors struggled to put good corporate governance 
practices in place. In the banking sector for instance, there were several bank 
collapses.41 According to Maimbo (2002:277), the bank failures of 1996 and 1997/8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mebelo Mutukwa, 1995, former managing partner at Pangae Partners  
41 In May 1995, Meridian Bank Zambia Limited collapsed. The African Commercial Bank and 
Commerce Bank followed this later that year. The turbulence experienced in the banking and financial 
sector had a severe impact on the banking and financial services system, resulting the failure of four 
more banks in 1997 and one in 1997. In December 1999, the African Commercial Bank, Credit Africa 
Bank, Manifold Investment Bank, Meridian BIAO Bank, and Prudence Bank were all in liquidation, 
while First Merchant Bank was undergoing re-organisation. The cost of these bank failures to the BoZ 
has been high, both financially and in terms of its reputation and credibility as a regulator and 
supervisor of the financial sector. As on 31 December 1997, the overdrawn accounts of the banking in 
liquidation at the Bank of Zambia were in excess of US$ 30million. Source: Maimbo, Samuel 
Munzele, 2002, ‘The diagnosis and prediction of bank failures in Zambia, 1990-98,’ Development 
Policy Review, 20, 3, 261-278. 
	  






did not occur suddenly, but, rather, were the culmination of a long process of 
financial deterioration and breaches of the laws on corporate governance. 
 
Critically underpinning these failures was the fact that the new private owners 
lacked knowledge of how to handle these enterprises. Most of the new directors of the 
newly privatised companies managed the corporate governance elements on a trial 
and error basis. The directors who succeeded in this trial and error process thrived but 
in contrast, the companies of unsuccessful directors simply collapsed. It was only 
toward the end of the Chiluba Era, that the Institute for Directors Zambia (IoDZ) was 
established to address this corporate governance deficit. The subject of corporate 
governance in Zambia cannot be spoken about without reference or attribution to the 
Institute of Directors Zambia (IoDZ) which saw and identified a knowledge gap and 
then created an institute responsible for the promotion of ‘high standards of corporate 
governance in both the private and public sectors in Zambia, through education, 
training, and participation at relevant fora;’42 by doing so, it instilled a culture of the 
highest standard of ethical and professional behaviour amongst directors and boards 
in the country. The institute was commissioned on 7 April 2000 from a background of 
political and economic development, which should be discussed in order to 
understand the prolonged progression of corporate governance in Zambia. While the 
IoDZ has been useful in facilitating learning and knowledge sharing among the 
directors of newly privatised enterprises, the organisation still appears to be in its 
infancy. Some more time will be needed before the IoDZ can develop corporate 
governance guidelines similar to the King III report in South Africa. 
 
To summarise: the Chiluba regime was marked by a surge in the number of 
privately owned corporations and by the establishment of the IoDZ following a 
comprehensive privatisation programme; this was the tipping point in the history of 
corporate governance practices in Zambia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Part of the Mission Statement of the Institute of Directors Zambia, accessed 14 February 2016 
	  




2.2.3. The Mwanawasa Era (2002-2008) 
The corporate governance regime in the Mwanawasa Era was characterised by 
remarkable levels of economic growth and investment, and entrenchment of 
meritocratic systems.  
 
The Mwanawasa Era saw exceptional growth and investment in the Zambian 
economy. Following four decades of economic contraction and stagnation under the 
Kaunda and Chiluba administrations, the Zambian economy grew sustainably at an 
average rate of 6.5% per year for seven years43. This growth had its roots in improved 
commodity prices and increased investor confidence in the economic policy 
environment. While acting together, these factors paved the way for significant 
increases in portfolio inflows and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It was during the 
Mwanawasa administration that foreign investors, for the first time, took investment 
positions in Zambian Kwacha denominated treasury bills, bonds and stocks on the 
Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE). Similarly, the country attracted mining investments 
in excess of US$ 1 billion to set up new copper mines at Lumwana and Kansanshi in 
North Western Zambia.44 With these vast investments came sophisticated corporate 
governance reforms and regulations in the banking and financial services sector: these 
were in the form of the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP).  
 
In the public sector, the Mwanawasa administration prudently guided the 
country to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point; this resulted 
in a complete write-off of Zambia’s external debt in 2006.45 This was a significant 
achievement if one bears in mind that the country had failed to reach this completion 
point during the Chiluba administration on account of imprudent fiscal management.  
The reason underpinning the Mwanawasa administration’s success was that the 
administration always sought the assistance of the most competent individuals to help 
develop the country. He hired a team of competent economic managers and provided 
them with the space to do what they thought was professionally necessary. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Data from database: World Development Indicators last updates on 30 January 2015. Accessed: 13 
February 2015 
44 Lumwana mine was set up in Zambia between 2002 and 2009 
45 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Press Release, ‘ IMF and World Bank support US$3.90 billion 
in debt service relief for Zambia,’ 8 April 2005, Press Release No. 05/80 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr0580.htm  
	  






professionalism eventually cascaded down to all levels of the public and private 
sectors. 
 
One possible yet fundamental criticism of the Mwanawasa regime was that 
corporate governance reforms did not completely match the levels of economic 
growth, investment and sophistication. To date, the corporate governance 
requirements for unlisted and privately owned medium-scale enterprises remain quite 
unclear. Despite all the strides that Zambia had made economically, its corporate 
governance structures have not developed at the same rate as the economy; indeed, 
the country’s corporate governance guidelines have marginally lagged its rising levels 
of economic sophistication. 
  
In sum, the Mwanawasa administration was an era of significant growth and 
consolidation of corporate governance structures and practices in Zambia. 
2.2.4. The Banda Era (2008 - 2011) 
The corporate governance regime under Rupiah Banda was mostly an extension of the 
Mwanawasa administration. One marked exception was the increase in financial 
regulation in the banking and financial services sectors that characterised the period 
after the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
President Banda inherited many of the structures and technocrats from the 
Mwanawasa administration, which allowed him to maintain the status quo to a great 
extent. Banda leveraged the governance structures left by Mwanawasa which 
comprised a meritocratic system with clear-cut guidelines on how to invest in Zambia, 
how to qualify for tax exemptions, and how to access finance; these structures were 
used to inspire continued confidence in the country’s economic policy management.  
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the Banda Administration 
increased the level of surveillance of the banking sector and raised the required 
reserves ratio, which limited the proportion of deposits that banks could lend out; 
punitive measures were promised for those institutions not complying. It was through 
these increased surveillance activities that the Bank of Zambia discovered that 
	  




Finance Bank had been flouting the shareholding requirements; thus, a single 
shareholder held more than a 25 per cent stake in the bank, contrary to the law.46 The 
Bank of Zambia prudentially took Finance Bank into curatorship in 2009. Following 
the takeover of Finance Bank, the Bank of Zambia outsourced the oversight of the 
day-to-day running of the bank to First National Bank (FNB) of South Africa.  
 
In common with the Mwanawasa regime, the main shortcoming of the Banda 
era is that it failed to improve corporate governance requirements for unlisted 
enterprises.  
 
Ultimately, the corporate governance regime under the Banda administration was 
characterised by a tightening of regulations in the banking and financial services 
sector in response to the international financial crisis of 2008. 
2.2.5. The Sata Era (after 2011-2014) 
In contrast to the preceding Mwanawasa regime, the Sata era was characterised by a 
significant decline in the corporate governance environment. Instead of building on 
the successes of previous administrations, President Sata blatantly disregarded 
corporate governance requirements. 
 
One could argue that serious challenges arose during the Sata era because the 
head of state did not appreciate the value of the corporate governance requirements in 
Zambia. However, it is important to note that the Zambian governmental system 
allows the president to appoint all chief executive officers (CEOs) in all parastatal 
institutions and gives authority to the minister to appointment the board of directors. 
This contradicts good corporate governance practices because accountability is very 
difficult to enforce when the president appoints the CEO and then entrusts his 
subordinate minister to appoint the board. This basically rendered the purpose of the 
board futile in the Sata era because the performance evaluation of the CEO could only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In 2010, the Bank of Zambia had seized the lender for breaching financial laws;  it had found that Dr. 
Rajan Mahtani, the lender’s largest shareholder, directly and indirectly held more than 25 per cent of 
the shares in the bank in contravention of CAP 387 (Banking and Financial Services Act) of the Laws 
of Zambia. He had agreed to sell it to Johannesburg-based FirstRand. Source: Matthew Hill, 2015, 










be done by the president himself and not the board: neither the board nor the minister 
had the power to remove the CEO as the head of state had appointed that person.  
 
Therefore, this era was characterised by a lack of proper separation of powers 
that would provide for effective checks and balances in the performance of the 
parastatals. The CEO, by virtue of being directly appointed by the president, was so 
powerful that he or she had no obligation to be accountable or answerable to the board 
or the minister in charge of that particular ministry. A recent example of this in 
Zambia was the selection of the two CEOs for the Zambia Railways and Zambia 
Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO); these were two of President Sata’s first 
appointments after his inauguration as President of the Republic of Zambia in 201147. 
The problem arising from both appointments was the same: how was the board 
supposed to manage the CEO when the president appointed that CEO and the minister 
appointed the board? These CEOs had more power than the board and therefore could 
not even be fired or disciplined by the board.  
 
Another example taken from the same period was the way the Sata 
government handled the Roads Board, known in Zambia as the Road Development 
Agency (RDA); this had moved its operating premises to the president’s residence 
and had not been audited between 2011 and 2014.48 As a semi-autonomous body, 
issuing contracts to the private sector, the RDA should have been operating as a 
stand-alone body but it was being controlled, in the Sata era, from State House. 
Proper corporate governance was very difficult to apply to an entity housed within the 
presidency, with much secrecy prevailing; it became a breeding ground for corruption 
and impropriety and misapplication of public funds; all of this is inconsistent with the 
practice of corporate governance.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 President Sata directly appointed Mr. Cyprian Chitundu as Managing Director of the ZESCO 
(http://www.zambia-weekly.com/archive/Zambia%20Weekly%20-%20week%2041.pdf) and Professor 
Clive Chirwa as Chief Executive Officer of Zambia Railways Limited 
(https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/11/15/professor-clive-chirwa-zambia-railways-boss/) in 2011 and 
2012 respectively. 
48 President Sata moved the Roads Development Agency (RDA) from the Ministry of Works and 
Supply to the State House in 2012 (http://zambiadailynation.com/2013/04/27/rda-in-road-contract-
scandal/ ) 
	  




Furthermore, a point of view from the private sector is that if Zambia had 
progressive corporate governance structures during the Sata administration, then it 
would not have accumulated a debt of US $4.8 billion dollars in the first three years 
of the Sata presidency.49 Others have argued that President Sata was initially reluctant 
to raise taxes because he could easily access debt from international markets and the 
Bretton Woods institutions;50 however, when the borrowing limits had been reached, 
the government was under considerable pressure to tax the mines more to meet the 
high demands of its infrastructure programme. Government decided to raise the taxes 
for the largest beneficiaries of infrastructure services rather than engaging the mines 
in discussions; the mines could have contributed as part of their corporate social 
responsibilities to the community and to the country as a whole. However, the 
government simply introduced various statutory instruments (e.g. SI 33 and SI 3551) 
and also a new requirement on Value Added Tax (VAT); thus, companies needed to 
produce receipts to get their VAT refunds and this left the companies in worse 
positions than before, because the government was not able to pay back the money 
owed in VAT refunds. Government therefore increased their taxes to counter this but 
the whole process had not been planned properly: in response, the mines retaliated by 
threatening to close operations.52  
 
Financial analyst, Maambo Hamoundu, is quoted in Zambia’s Daily Nation 
Newspaper as questioning Government’s failure to pay VAT refunds to mines, which 
in response to non-payment were threatening to close and lay off workers in order to 
sustain their operations; after all,  the mines relied on payment then reinvestment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2015, National Budget Speech, Lusaka: Ministry of 
Finance 
50 This term refers to the three institutions created at the Bretton Woods conference of 1945. These are: 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization). 
51 Statutory Instrument 33 and Statutory Instrument 35 were intended to restrict trading in foreign 
currencies and enhance accountability in the reporting of copper exports.  
52 Sinyangwe Chiwoyu, quotes a source from the Zambian Ministry of Finance in his article: 
‘[Zambian Finance Minister] Chikwanda wants government to pay mines $600m in VAT refunds,’ 28th 
July 2014, Post Newspaper Zambia: ‘The minister [Chikwanda] says our current fiscal space is 
severely constrained for us to refund these mining companies of their VAT but that we can only clear 
the huge backlog by negotiating staggered repayments with the mining companies after we have 










some of the VAT refunds into their operations53. If government had maintained 
sufficient dialogue with the mines then it would have requested the mines to meet 
some of the costs of the new infrastructure as a corporate social responsibility 
initiative; this could have been done without having to increase the tax and putting the 
jobs of thousands of Zambians at risk.  
 
In sum, one could argue that the Sata administration was an era of diminished 
corporate governance structures and practices in Zambia. 
2.2.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion: it is clear the five governmental eras are characterised by differences in 
their contribution towards, and impact on, the progression of corporate governance in 
Zambia. The Kenneth Kaunda administration had an extremely limited private 
participation, which resulted from the constraints of the Leadership Code. Even if 
there had been a private sector during his time, it would not have grown. The Fredrick 
Chiluba administration was a period of trial and error. The Levy Mwanawasa era 
actually saw consolidation of all the trials of the previous administration, and the 
Banda era further consolidated these in an effort to avoid the collapse of Zambian 
banks during the 2008 World Economic Crunch; however, no new developments 
occurred during this time. Finally, the Michael Sata administration caused a 
regression because government started having direct influence on appointments of 
boards again and it became involved in the actual operations: all of these 
developments caused the progression of corporate governance in Zambia to take a 
few steps backwards.  Poor corporate governance discourages foreign direct 
investment into a country as business operations are politically regulated, thereby 
providing very little investor security in the absence of a proper corporate governance 
policy.  
2.3. A PROLONGED INFANCY  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Daily Nation Reporter,  ‘VAT refund can help ease mines pressure – expert’ Zambia Daily Nation 
Newspaper, 21 September 2015. http://zambiadailynation.com/2015/09/21/vat-refund-can-help-ease-
mines-pressure-expert/	  	  
	  




Any discussion of corporate governance in Zambia needs to make reference to the 
Institute of Directors Zambia (IoDZ). This Institute is responsible for identifying the 
need to promote, ‘high standards of corporate governance in both the private and 
public sectors in Zambia, through education, training, and participation at relevant 
fora;54’ the aim was to instil a culture of ensuring the highest standard of ethical and 
professional behaviour amongst directors and boards in the country. The institute was 
therefore commissioned on 7 April 2000 against a background of political and 
economic developments, which has been discussed above.  This development brought 
understanding to the prolonged progression of corporate governance in Zambia 
despite its general weak and inadequate nature of failing to ensure maximum 
compliance in the sector. Despite certain shortcomings, the IoDZ continues to 
promote the advancement of best business practices and has promoted some 
successful interventions in the recent past.  
2.3.1. Awareness 
On the subject of awareness, the Institute of Directors Zambia has been conducting 
corporate governance training and sensitisation programmes since 2001, aimed at 
both the private and public sector companies, organisations and institutions. 
 
 At the end of December 2014, more than 4 000 individuals had been 
sensitised or trained in corporate governance. The Institute has a pool of more than 40 
trainers who were trained by the Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank. The number of trained 
personnel tasked with fostering awareness of corporate governance shows a 
considerable amount of effort; nevertheless, it is disappointing that relatively few 
people have been trained in the last 15 years (2000 -2015). This suggests that the 
Institution’s initiatives in corporate governance awareness are not being incorporated 
into business strategy in most Zambian businesses, because of lack of awareness. 
2.3.2. Significant Efforts so far 
One of the projects undertaken by the IoDZ includes the revision of the Corporate 
Governance Guidelines for the National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO). 
The Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) makes provision for corporate 
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governance reforms in the financial sector, by conducting a Corporate Governance 
status audit, developing a Corporate Governance Code and a Code of Ethics, 
developing a Curriculum for training directors as well as conducting sensitisation 
workshops for selected directors. In addition to these projects, the IoDZ has also been 
involved in the establishment of the FSDP corporate governance reforms in the 
pensions, insurance sector and capital markets.  
2.4. CONCLUSION 
This overview of the historical background of corporate governance in Zambia 
provides a good platform for understanding the prolonged infancy of corporate 
governance in that country. This overview also provides a suitable introduction to the 
details of the law and practice of corporate governance in Zambia. 
  
	  





SECTION III: LAW AND PRACTICE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Zambian legislation on corporate governance, and particularly the Zambian 
Companies Act, generally aims to provide strong protection to shareholder rights in 
companies and businesses. To support this legislation, Zambia has corporate 
governance codes in place such as the Lusaka Stock Exchange Code (LuSE Code), 
IODZ Corporate Governance Code for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and 
the Bank of Zambia Guidelines for financial institutions; all of these provide tools and 
guidelines on good business practices. Also, Zambia is one of the countries awaiting 
guidelines from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which is currently working in partnership with governments to develop 
guidelines for State-owned Companies (SOCs) or State-owned Enterprises (SOEs); 
the IoDZ has been involved in this initiative from its inception.  
 
 Zambian corporate governance is generally regulated by legislation and best 
practice codes. However, this still raises the question of whether these initiatives and 
instruments are effective and if so, to what extent? The aim of this section is to use 
Zambia as a case study to analyse, from an African country’s perspective, the 
challenges associated with compliance and respect for the rule of law, in an effort to 
see how compliance with the rules of corporate governance can be strengthened. 
3.2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEGISLATION IN ZAMBIA  
Firstly, it is important to reiterate that corporate governance covers a broad spectrum 
of issues that cannot easily be addressed in one chapter of the Zambian Companies 
Act. Thus, corporate governance covers the following topics: accounting and 
auditing; strategic leadership; risk management; integrated reporting; transparency 
and disclosure; the environment; social impact; and, governance in general. The 
question therefore should not be: ‘should corporate governance in Zambia be an act of 
	  






volunteerism or would it be mandatory’ Instead, the question should be: ‘is there a 
way by which we can strengthen corporate governance structures in Zambia without 
necessarily prescribing it as legislation order to ensure compliance through effective 
regulation and enforcement?’  
 
In essence, many of the principles of corporate governance already exist in the 
law, embodied in various pieces of legislation. Any attempt to expand or grow this 
legislation will not answer the question of compliance; on the contrary, compliance 
can best be made effective by enforcing the law.  
3.3. THE ZAMBIAN COMPANIES ACT - CAP 388 
The artificial nature of a company creates a very specific problem because it does not 
physically exist, even though it is a legal entity. A company can only function through 
the medium of the agency of human beings. The two primary corporate organs of a 
company are: 
(a) General Meetings where members act collectively to make decisions 
for the Company; 
(b)   The board of directors. 
It is primarily through these organs that the Company functions. Thus, section 215 (1) 
of the Companies Act states: 
 ‘... the business of a company shall be managed by the directors, 
who may pay all expenses incurred in promoting and forming the 
company, and may exercise all such powers of the company as are not, by 
this Act or the articles, required to be exercised by the company by 
resolution.’ 
Apart from the two organs mentioned above, there are professional managerial 
organs. The function of the board of directors is of an intermittent basis while the 
management team carries out the functions of the company on behalf of the board of 
directors. The board of directors and the managers of companies are expected to also 
promote good corporate governance practices in fulfilling their roles; these practices 
include good leadership, accountability, responsibility, transparency, and 
	  




sustainability, all as part of the business of the company.  
3.3.1. Directors’ Duties 
As mentioned previously, legislation and corporate governance principles often 
interlock. This applies especially to the basic Zambian law on directors’ fiduciary 
duties, of which the main one is to act in good faith in the interests of the company; 
this requirement, also known as acting bona fide,  is the minimum standard expected 
of a director under Zambian law.  
Other duties include the duty to exercise powers for proper purposes, the duty to 
avoid a conflict of interest, the duty not to make hidden or secret profits, and the duty 
of applying care and skill. These are the main fiduciary duties indicated in the 
Zambian Companies act, from where corporate governance principles are supposed to 
be derived and implemented. However, it could be argued that the Zambian 
Companies Act is a ‘narrow’ piece of legislation that only focuses on the company 
and the protection of shareholders as far as the procedures of a business are 
concerned. This Act is perceived as relying and focussing mostly on financial 
reporting55 for enforcing company responsibility and accountability. The Act does not 
have a broad based inclusive approach that can take into consideration the different 
stakeholders associated with the operations of a company; also, there are no 
specifications for the promotion of corporate governance principles as a requirement 
under law.  Consequently, the LuSE Code can be regarded as weak as it has no legal 
status.   
3.3.2. No requirement by Zambian law for independent non-executive directors 
One weakness in Zambian company law, making it inconsistent with corporate 
governance principles, is that section 208 of the Act does not distinguish between the 
different types of directors; however it recognises that a company can have both 
executive and non-executive directors. Independent non-executive directors can be 
understood as: ‘able to irrefutably demonstrate their independence; they should be 
responsible to shareholders; and they should be available to devote the time required 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Half of the Companies Act 388 (Part V to Part VIII) gives a clear illustration of the weakness of 
Zambian laws in enforcing corporate governance; this Act focuses mainly on the financial aspects of 
reporting.  The Act categorically lays out fiscal legal requirements (Part IV: Shares & Share Capital, 
Part V: Debentures and Charges, Part VI: Public Issue of Shares, Part VII: Meetings & Resolutions, 
Part VIII: Accounts, Audit and Annual Returns)  
	  






of the role of an independent director.’56 In jurisdictions with advanced codes and 
legislation on corporate governance, it is a requirement for companies to have 
independent directors and it is also highly recommended that these directors have 
specified periods of tenure. A rotation of independent directors should encourage 
effective performance by the other directors and should promote the much-needed 
application of corporate governance principles.  
One could argue that legal issues on corporate governance can be addressed in 
different pieces of legislation; for example issues pertaining to the environment would 
be enshrined in the Zambian Environmental and Management Act [2011].  However, 
the main concern is to determine what needs to be done to ensure that companies and 
businesses abide by the laws already in place. The levels of compliance have been 
low, as will be shown in the sections of this thesis that discuss the challenges of 
compliance and enforcement in Zambia (Section 3.5) 	  
 
It should be noted that not all principles of corporate governance can be 
incorporated into law, as some of these are best addressed in Best Practice Guidelines, 
which are usually adopted voluntarily, rather than prescribed. Legislation is not 
necessarily the answer as it can only work to a certain extent. Legal cases dealing 
with corporate governance all address different issues and for every such issue there 
are different repercussions. These can be civil or criminal repercussions; for example 
the issue of tax avoidance in Zambia is both a corporate governance principle as well 
as a criminal offence. One of the solutions could therefore be to apply the law against 
a background where corporate governance principles and guidelines are highly 
promoted and championed by legal practitioners, encouraging businesses to improve 
their application and enforcement. 
3.4. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF THE LUSAKA STOCK EXCHANGE 
CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The perception that the institutions of corporate governance in Zambia are weak and 
or inadequate continues to flourish. It is often argued that the notion of corporate 
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governance cannot be advanced on the mere basis that the enforcement mechanisms 
are either weak or non-existent. Any attempt to enforce corporate governance in 
Zambia, through legislation alone, has clearly proven its limitations, as shown in 
section 3.3. However, Zambia has created a corporate governance Code under the 
auspices of the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE), which has been in existence for more 
than ten years (since 2003). The aim and expectation of this Code is to increase 
awareness and practice of good corporate governance. A number of similar codes 
have been drafted in other countries for these purposes. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of these codes, particularly the LuSE Code can only be ascertained by 
exploring it’s impact on the market and examining the impact and the role it’s played 
following it’s introduction.  
 
This section will begin with a brief outline of what constitutes the LuSE Code and 
will look at its strengths and capacity to enforce and ensure compliance. This will be 
followed by an examination of the key drivers in the LuSE Code, leading to 
recommendations on what the ideal code for Zambia should ideally be.  
3.4.1. The LuSE Code  
Corporate governance codes are intended to assist directors in discharging their legal 
duties. In the analysis of the Lusaka Stock Exchange Code, below, it is important 
always to bear in mind that it was written for directors to help them understand their 
duties. Codes formalise, influence and raise corporate governance awareness and this 
is meant to influence the investment industry and direct the ways in which 
participants conduct themselves in the corporate world. One can debate the extent to 
which these codes are effective. It is from this perceptive that the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange Code (LuSE Code) will be discussed below.   
3.4.1.1. A Principle-based Approach 
In corporate governance, there is a rules-based approach and a principle-based 
approach for ensuring compliance. A principle-based approach features flexibility;  it 
is not prescribed but is voluntarily opted into by institutions, One may argue that such 
an approach is more difficult to follow than a rules-based approach which entails 
mandatory application by ‘ticking the requirement boxes’ in order to prove 
compliance.  It might seem that a principle-based approach is better as it allows 
institutions to operate in a ‘laissez faire’ way and as none of the characteristics are 
	  






mandatory, this allows for flexibility in application if any changes in the practices 
arise; it is not necessary to wait for a parliamentary sitting in order to change the law.  
The Zambian LuSE Code has a principle-based approach involving ‘comply 
or explain’, which brings a dynamic aspect to the issue of regulation and enforcement. 
The comply or explain approach is a laissez faire market-based approach in which 
corporate governance codes and or other regulatory bodies provide for minimum 
standard requirements from institutions, as opposed to having binding laws. For 
example, the company management would be required to explain how the principles 
of the code were applied; if they were not, then reasons for such non-compliance must 
be given. The LuSE Code is therefore a non-mandatory code but its enforceability is 
based upon it being a listing requirement as outlined in the booklet titled ‘LuSE 
Harmonised Listing Requirements of the Lusaka Stock Exchange. 57 Apart from this, 
its existence is primarily justified by influencing the investment industry to apply, 
voluntarily, corporate governance characteristics on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. This 
approach, however, has certain limitations and these will be discussed below.  
3.4.1.2. A toothless mechanism 
The disadvantage of a non-mandatory corporate governance system in a 
country such as Zambia is that voluntary practices to enforce corporate governance 
would not succeed. Thus, most African countries such as Zambia still need to mature 
to the stage where self-regulation and enforcement would take place; one obstacle to 
success is the rampant levels of corruption that surround most business transactions 
and their operations; here, Zambia ranks 85 out of 175 on the Corruption Index58. One 
could argue that the preferred approach should not be to criminalise non-compliance 
by having strict laws in place; instead, ‘soft’ laws can be equally effective if well 
enforced and regulated and these could still maintain the flexibility needed for 
adapting to the ever-changing business environment. Soft laws as defined by 
Professor Timothy Meyer can be understood as ‘identifying the chief “legal” 
characteristic of soft law: the expectation that a non-binding rule will be incorporated 
into a binding agreement, either as an interpretation of an existing binding rule (at 
either the domestic or international level), or through the promulgation of a new set of 
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binding rules…based on the nonbinding rules59’. In summary, a non-legal 
requirement placed in a binding document would require compliance if it is part of a 
binding agreement or understanding.  
   
3.4.1.3. Listing Requirements 
One of the limitations of the LuSE Code is that it targets a very small number 
of institutions; this is because its purposes are aimed at companies listed and quoted 
on the Lusaka stock market. Although the LuSE Code applies to both the public and 
private sector, it nonetheless targets only a narrow selection of companies; it omits 
many other market players that are not listed on the stock exchange but still require 
their corporate governance best practices to be scrutinised and regulated.  This latter 
group of organisations comprises the largest number of players in the business 
landscape in Zambia. The omission occurs because the LuSE Code only governs 
listed and quoted companies, which are required by the stock exchange to submit their 
end-of-year reports within three months of the end of their financial year; those 
reports must state areas of compliance and non-compliance with an explanation for 
the latter. Therefore unlisted companies have no obligation to respect or uphold 
corporate governance policies.  
 
One could argue that corporate governance is only to be enforced by ‘big’ 
corporates whose environmental, social, community and economic impacts are 
assumed to be equally large. However this should be seen as a poor argument as there 
are ‘big’ corporates in Zambia that choose not to be listed and therefore some form of 
regulation and enforcement mechanism would have to exist to make them comply. 
This group of corporates includes both local and foreign corporates that usually avoid 
a local listing on the basis that the company is already listed on a more prominent 
stock exchange. The question then arises:  how do we regulate non-listed companies? 
Also, how would we ensure that FDI companies comply with corporate governance 
requirements if they opt out of being listed? How do we regulate our own local 
businesses that still have a significant impact in the business environment but do not 
see the need to be publicly listed? This poor attitude of certain companies is costing 
many African countries, such as Zambia, in terms of growth opportunities and in 
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terms of attracting more investment and industrial growth. The root cause is the 
failure to provide an all-inclusive corporate governance system that includes both 
listed and non-listed companies.	  	  
3.4.1.4. Self-Regulation 
The LuSE Code, in common with many well-established corporate 
governance codes, promotes compliance by relying on self-regulation and there is no 
mandated or governing institution to ensure enforcement. The current system has no 
power or authority to require compliance unless the institution in question is a listed 
company. This is an extension of the ‘listed requirement’ problem, discussed above, 
that impedes enforcement because only two regulatory acts exist: these only cover the 
public companies currently listed on the Lusaka Stock Exchange60 or the financial 
banking institutions covered by the Bank of Zambia Corporate Governance Code. All 
other institutions outside these two sectors have no strict regulatory systems. Even the 
existing systems are weak and ineffective as far as compliance is concerned; this will 
be demonstrated in later examples. 
3.4.1.5. Lack of awareness 
Another limitation of the LuSE Code is the lack of proper awareness of its 
regulatory and enforcement requirements; this lack of awareness applies especially to 
the managers of the corporations listed. One can ask whether the average person on 
the street realises or understands how his or her company should present audit reports 
according to the LuSE Code. It is stating the obvious to claim that stakeholders should 
be, and are, the REAL compliance officers but they can only be empowered to act as 
such if they understand and are aware of what to look out for. 
3.4.2. Summary of Key Drivers of the LuSE Code 
Corporate governance could be regarded as a performance management and 
performance judgement system of a company. Taking this into account, a company 
becomes a complicated operation and the best way to deal with such complexity is to 
divide the company into parts and to apply corporate governance processes to each 
part.  The application of those processes to complex company situations calls for 
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some optimisation and in order to optimise, there is a need for good law and for best 
practice principles, that are stakeholder inclusive, to be in place.  
	  
The LuSE Code identifies nine main drivers of corporate governance and 
these are as follows: 
a) Board of Directors  
b) Board of Committees 
c) Legal and Compliance 
d) External Audit 
e) Internal Audit  
f) Risk Management 
g) Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
h) Disclosure and Stakeholder Communication 
i) Organisation Integrity	  
	  
  Both the Zambian Companies Act and the LuSE Code exhibit a bias towards 
the financial aspects of corporate governance, with little evidence of any integrated 
approach that would take into account the various stakeholders affected by the 
company. 
3.4.3 Reviewing specific sections of the LuSE Code 
 
At the outset, it is important to recognise that the list of key corporate governance 
structures in the LuSE Code does not include either Ethical Leadership or the 
Governance of Information Technology Systems (Governance of IT); indeed these 
have not yet been established in the LuSE Code. One can argue that all the 
components of the Code are equally important, but ethical leadership should be the 
fundamental one, at the centre of all issues. Without ethical leadership to enhance 
good corporate governance practice, the whole Code is futile in the long run. For this 
reason, this section will put forward a recommendation for the LuSE Code to include 
both Ethical Leadership and Governance of IT. In addition, selected key drivers 
identified in the LuSE Code will be reviewed. Suggestions will be recommended for 
the following key drivers: Board of Directors, Audit Committees, Risk Management 
and Disclosure and Stakeholder Communication.   
	  







One important purpose of corporate governance is to ensure ethical ways of 
doing business. Reporting, for example, covers regulatory practices underpinned by 
principles that guide the leadership in a corporation to report honestly on their 
compliance levels. 
 
Zambia should therefore make efforts to introduce Ethical Leadership into the 
Code, as one of the drivers; this should require boards to ensure that their companies 
are seen to be responsible corporate citizens. Leadership must be based on ethical 
foundations that take into consideration economic, social and environmental impacts 
in the implementation of company strategies and policies.  
 
The LuSE Code can also require management to cultivate a culture of ethical 
conduct by taking the following steps: 
 
• Establish an ethics risk profile 
• Establish a code of conduct 
• Integrate ethics into all company practices, procedures and policies 
• Ensure that the company’s ethics performance is supported by an assurance 
statement in an Integrated Report 
	  
The requirement of a Code of Ethics is important as it creates guidelines of 
conduct for a business. More importantly the board must ensure that these ethics are 
actually integrated in the company’s practices. 
Governance of Information Technology 
	  
The responsibility for IT governance is another element excluded from the key 
corporate governance drivers in the LuSE Code. This exclusion represents a 
shortcoming in view of the rapid development of information systems and electronic 
transactions in the corporate world today. For this reason, responsibility for IT 
governance should rest with the board and be leveraged to improve performance and 
sustainability of the company. The LuSE Code should establish IT governance 
	  




frameworks to ensure that IT assets are managed effectively; issues include security, 
information management and privacy. The risk management and audit committees 
should assist the Board in addressing its IT responsibilities. 
Board of Directors  
The LuSE Code stipulates numerous corporate governance requirements for 
the board of directors of listed and quoted companies on the stock exchange. This 
section focusses on some of the most crucial requirements stipulated in the Board of 
Directors sector of the LuSE Code. 
The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officers. 
The board chairman is expected to be an independent non-executive director. 
However, the LuSE Code and the Zambian Companies Act do not distinguish 
between a chief executive officer and a chairman and do not prohibit a situation in 
which one person fills both positions. This is contrary to the need for division of 
powers, which is essential for effective corporate governance.  Chief Executive and 
Financial Officers (CEOs/ CFOs) should be treated as contracted employees of the 
company despite being appointed by the board. By virtue of their position on the 
board they should vote in their capacity as a director of the company which means 
that they vote in the best interests of the company as required by a DIRECTOR:  they 
cannot merely represent management and its interests. This issue is not precisely 
addressed in the Code.  
Board Meetings and Board Evaluations 
Other key requirements outlined for the board of directors are that boards 
should meet at least once a year and must establish benchmarks to evaluate 
performance. 
Director Compensation 
Remuneration of each individual director should be disclosed and the board is 
expected to have clear transparent policies in place on executive remuneration.  
Executive and non-executive directors 
The LuSE Code stipulates the importance of having non-executive directors 
but does not give precise details of what is expected of them. The Code refers to the 
issue of a director devoting adequate time to his role and indicates that  “‘adequate 
	  






time” shall be determined by the board.’61 The Code also does not give a precise 
definition of what is to be understood by ‘independent’ and this is left open to 
interpretation. This is an important point as the independence of a director serving on 
the board should be reviewed from time to time to check that his or her independence 
has not been impaired over time. The silence of the Code on this issue weakens 
regulations further, as directors and chairpersons in Zambia are known to hold board 
positions for indefinite periods of time. There are so many gaps in the LuSE Code on 
the issue of directorship that even issues of conflict of interest within the company are 
left to the Companies Act to define precisely.  
Audit Committees  
Two separate audit committees are mentioned in the LuSE Code: the internal 
and external audit committee. The Code lays great emphasis on how these two 
committees should coordinate their work. There are no stipulations concerning the 
number or qualifications of members that should constitute these committees; this 
makes the LuSE Code too general and vague although clear guidance is needed. The 
LuSE Code should add a requirement that audit committee members should, 
collectively, have an understanding of integrated reporting (including financial 
reporting) as this is becoming increasingly important in the way annual reports are 
presented. Audit committees should take into consideration all internal financial 
controls, external and internal audit processes, corporate law, risk management, 
sustainability factors, IT Governance and other governance processes. By doing so, 
they can report holistically on the effectiveness of the company’s financial controls 
and performance. In addition to this, the audit report should give full description of 
how audit functions were carried out. 
Internal Auditors 
The Luse Code should also include a provision that an internal audit 
committee must recommend to stakeholders the appointment, re-appointment and 
removal of external auditors and should also ensure that the recommended external 
auditor is approved by LuSE Stock Exchange guidelines. Internal audit should be in a 
position to provide the board with a written assessment of the effectiveness of the 
system of internal controls and risk management. 
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Risk Management  
	  
The Code indicates that issues of risk governance and key performance 
indicators, as part of risk management identification, are the responsibility of the 
board. This responsibility would ultimately include risk management policy and 
planning, because limits of tolerance are set and should be monitored by the board 
through the appointment of a risk committee; in practice this function may be 
assigned to the audit committee. Any risk management reviews or concerns of the 
company’s risk management should form part of the integrated report. 
	  
Disclosure & Stakeholder Communication 
	  
Disclosure and stakeholder communication is listed as the eighth driver in the 
LuSE Code; that Code has a very narrow approach to stakeholder communication and 
this should be expanded on. Thus, disclosure is covered to some degree by the 
requirement that boards must disclose company details to the stakeholders through the 
annual report; however, the establishment of formal procedures for communicating to 
stakeholders is not addressed sufficiently and therefore there is room for expansion. 
The importance of stakeholder relations should not be overlooked as stakeholder 
engagement forms the cornerstone of sustainability in corporate governance. 
Communication with stakeholders should be transparent, simple, and understandable 
and in accordance with communication standards adopted by the board; also, the 
board should be encouraged to ensure that internal and or external disputes are 
resolved efficiently and effectively. The LuSE Code should encourage the board to 
consider arbitration, mediation and conciliation as alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) processes, in place of court proceedings, as ADR is usually more cost 
effective and efficient in terms of time. ADR has become accepted globally as an 
important element of good governance as it allows disputes to be resolved efficiently, 
timeously and effectively taking both parties into account. 
 
However, the limitations of the LuSE Code are not the only challenges in 
ensuring effective regulation and enforcement. Other challenges exist and with these 
in mind, this section will now present a discussion of how to deal with foreign direct 
	  






investors in a country such as Zambia; real examples are used as case studies to 
illustrate the challenges surrounding listed and unlisted corporates. 
3.5. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES AFFECTING ENFORCEMENT OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA:  
3.5.1 Dealing with Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs): Sweet Nothings  
Action Aid International Zambia recently produced a report entitled ‘Sweet 
Nothings,’ featuring the activities of Illovo, the South African FDI in Zambia. Illovo 
is Africa’s biggest sugar producer and also a subsidiary of the global food giant 
Associated British Foods (ABF).62 Illovo was operating under the trading name 
‘Zambia Sugar’ and had been dealing in tax avoidance schemes through the so-called 
‘tax haven’ approach, with countries such as Mauritius, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, which are commonly known to host holding companies even though 
their business operations are in Zambia; the aim was to pay less tax in Zambia63. 
Avoiding tax is a criminal offence under Part IX sections 94 – 97 of the Income Tax 
Act Cap 323 but at the same time tax avoidance would also fall under the corporate 
governance principles of Ethical Leadership, Responsible Investing and Integrated 
Reporting.  A weakness in these elements of enforcement is hindering effective 
regulation and enforcement of corporate governance in Zambia; this will be further 
illustrated in the subsequent subsections.  A strong corporate governance structure in 
Zambia would help to promote the application of these principles; for example, a 
detailed annual report would expose loopholes of the type used by Zambia Sugar to 
avoid paying taxes.  
 
In 2013, Action Aid reported that a street vendor selling the processed sugar 
produced by Zambia Sugar Nakambala Estates in Mazabuka was paying 4.6% income 
tax on his or her net income; thus, the average monthly income was ZWK650, 000  of 
which an average of ZWK 30, 000 per month was paid in income tax. In contrast, 
Zambia Sugar Company paid 0% tax between 2008 and 2010 despite the average 
annual net income being ZWK 56, 270, 667, 000, which amounted to approximately 
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US $500, 000, 000. This finding does not imply that the employment that Zambia 
Sugar creates is of no significance as it gives thousands of employees64 an income to 
provide for their families. However, tax revenues can go towards improving 
infrastructure and providing basic amenities at affordable prices as long as these taxes 
are channelled back into the Zambian economy. 
 
One of the principles of corporate governance is responsible investing and this 
requires companies such as Zambia Sugar to be responsible to their consumers, 
responsible to employees, responsible to their communities and responsible for 
environmental management in the areas where they operate. Zambia Sugar was 
making vast profits but at the same time finding ways to shrink its tax bill and by 
doing so, was avoiding its responsibilities; this is an example of the bad corporate 
practices that Zambia needs to counter. The solution does not have to be by 
prescription through the law. Instead the solution probably lies in corporate 
governance codes as a mechanism of ‘soft laws,’ as opposed to criminalisation.  
 
Nonetheless, the current corporate governance system can be regarded as 
‘toothless’ and so both potential solutions present challenges in making multinational 
organisations, such as the sugar giant, abide by domestic rules and regulations. To 
begin with, corporate governance principles are not mandatory for companies and 
businesses that are not listed on the Lusaka Stock Exchange. Any attempt aimed at 
enforcing and building corporate governance in Zambia will run into difficulties with 
unlisted companies, as enforceability is only a requirement for the select few listed on 
the stock exchange.  
 
Furthermore, most multinational companies such as IIovo, which owns 51% 
of Zambia Sugar, and many others such as the mining conglomerates operating in 
Zambia (e.g. Glencore), do not need to be listed on the local stock market. This 
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presents a problem because these companies can choose to list on other stock markets 
and not on the Zambia stock exchange. In this situation, the requirement to uphold 
corporate governance principles becomes a voluntary option while the companies take 
advantage of some of the stakeholders; this was the case with Zambia Sugar and its 
employees and the community in which the company operates. This is a clear 
example of one of the challenges surrounding enforcement and regulation of 
corporate governance principles in Zambia and most African countries in general.  
 
Most FDIs have their holding companies in other countries and rarely list on 
the local stock market although Zambia Sugar is an exception. However, this raises 
concerns over the issue of jurisdiction, which becomes relevant in the event of a 
dispute or non-enforcement of corporate governance guidelines. Zambia and other 
African countries should consider promoting corporate governance principles through 
entry policies or doing business in their country for foreign direct investors. Another 
option is the incorporation of non-governmental institutions to promote corporate 
governance compliance, which would make it more attractive for business owners to 
follow the guidelines. This would also be a way of attracting reputable investors who 
support the idea of responsible investing.  
 
The counter argument to this recommendation is that FDI may be discouraged 
in a country such as Zambia if entry is considered to be subject to rigid rules, or too 
costly, or requiring too much time and effort. Zambia is currently ranked 7th 65 on the 
continent in terms of countries easiest to do business in. It is not surprising to find 
bureaucracy and red tape in many countries, especially in regulation and enforcement 
of policy; there is often bribery66 and cutting of corners to have the paper work 
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completed in a reasonable time. Zambia needs to be seen as business-friendly and 
therefore should avoid stringent regulations and policies in setting up a company or 
doing business.  
 
Moreover, the relative ease of doing business on the African continent has 
brought in new dynamics and risks, with the influx of Chinese investments into 
Zambia and Africa as a whole. These dynamics and risks stem from a lack of 
appropriate and strong regulatory and enforcement mechanisms of corporate 
governance; therefore, countries tend to lose more than they gain from the long-term 
presence of enormous Chinese investments on the continent.  
3.5.2. Dynamics and risks around Chinese Investment and possible short-term 
gain from exploitation 
‘The dramatic rise of China has stopped the process of marginalization of Africa in 
world trade.’67 
	  
China’s presence on the African continent can no longer go unnoticed. China 
increased its imports into Africa from US$5.3 billion in 2000 to US$38.8 billion in 
2009. Exports increased from US$3.5 billion in 2000 to US$33.2 billion in 2009.68 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, below, illustrate an increase in Chinese foreign direct investment 
which countries such as Zambia have not adequately prepared for, in terms of how to 
accommodate these investors and hold them accountable in their corporate dealings 
on the continent.  
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Many of the large Chinese corporate activities are politically affiliated as 
Chinese investors have seen the gap presented by African leaders; that gap is in 
infrastructure building70.  
 
African governments, when contracting with Chinese businesses, should have 
firm legal, regulatory and corporate government structures in place in order to 
command application and enforcement by the Chinese investors. There are a large 
number of Chinese FDIs in Zambia, involved in road construction and a broad 
spectrum of infrastructure construction; in most cases the contracts are probably more 
generous and lenient than they would receive as an investor in their home country, 
China itself. More often than not, the infrastructure developmental projects given to 
Chinese investors appear to short-change the African host country. Lumingu 
vehemently expresses his views using the Democratic Republic of Congo as an 
example on this topic, by illustratively expressing the common perception of road 
construction handled by Chinese investors in most African countries by stating the 
following: 
The consequence is that where Western companies are building roads 
designed for long life, the Chinese are building roads [that are] less 
sophisticated that cracks are easily perceived the same day of the official 
opening. And behind this sad state lie[s] several realities: the Chinese 
offer their services at an affordable cost for the Congolese, this is an 
open secret, but the bribes and commissions constitute the hidden part of 
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Chapter 2. Chinese investments in SEZs in Africa 
2.1  China-SSA trade and rationale for SEZs  
The economic rationale for Chinese investments in SEZs seems to be anchored in the burgeoning 
trade between China and SSA that has expanded over 100-fold  since  1990.  While  China’s  imports  of  
commodities from Africa—mainly minerals and oil—drive much of this trade, there has been an 
equally dramatic growth of manufacturing exports from China to SSA (see Figures 2.1-2.2). Chinese 
imports increased from US$5.3 billion in 2000 to US$38.0 billion in 2009 while Chinese exports 
increased from US$3.5 billion in 2000 to US$33.2 billion in 2009. SSA recorded a trade surplus with 
China throughout the period.  
 
Figure 2.1: Total trade (imports + exports) between 
China and Africa in 1990-2008 (US$ mn) 
Figure 2.2: Chinese trade balance with Africa in 2009 
by sector (US$ mn)  
  
  Source: Bräutigam, Farole and Tang (2010). 
 
Chinese trade with Ethiopia, Mauritius and Nigeria also expanded in 2000-2009. In contrast to 
Chinese trade with SSA, China recorded trade surpluses with the three countries for each year 
during the ten-year period (see Figures 2.3-2.4). First, Chinese trade with Ethiopia expanded for 
most of the period nd Chi ese exports exce ed Chinese imports by  factor of five. Second, 
Chinese imports from Mauritius remaining largely flat while Chinese exports to Mauritius grew 
rapidly throughout most of the period. In 2009, Chinese imported goods from Mauritius worth 
US$6 million while it exported goods to Mauritius worth US$292 million. Third, Chinese trade with 
Nigeria expanded for most of the period although the aggregate value of imports was rather 
volatile, reflecting commodity prices. Chinese exports to Nigeria exceeded imports by a factor of six. 
 
A look at trade in specific product categories indicates that Chinese exports to the three countries 
were overwhelmingly comprised of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment (see 
Table 2.1). Chinese imports were mainly made up of: (i) oil seeds and oil fruits (crude materials, 94 
percent) from Ethiopia; (ii) oil and gas (mineral fuels, 93 percent) from Nigeria; and (iii) food and 











































































 It is therefore important for African governments to require a skills transfer 
policy, environmental protection, corporate social responsibility as well as respect for 
the rule of law and financial regulations. The host government should do this as part 
of their ESG requirements. By doing this, the community in which the Chinese FDI is 
operating in and making a return, also benefits both indirectly and directly. This 
benefit is not only in terms of the infrastructure development but also in terms of 
other deliverables such as job creation, protection of the environment, water and 
sanitation as well as waste management in the community. This gives the local 
community and other stakeholders a sense of trust and transparency, as the Chinese 
are conscious of the need to invest responsibly even as they aim to make a profit. 
Social and environmental impact management strategies are a prerequisite for 
sustainable development and are needed to earn the trust and support of the 
surrounding community. This is a corporate governance principle that all businesses, 
whether local or an FDI, should abide by. 
 
This discussion should not suggest that the issues are confined to FDIs 
operating on the continent. The same concerns apply to local businesses, and perhaps 
even more so than to the foreign direct investors; after all, these local businesses and 
companies in Zambia are rarely listed on the stock exchange and therefore any 
attempts at enforceability and regulation of their corporate governance operations are 
almost non-existent. However, even listed companies pose challenges.  An example 
will be presented, in the next section, using a listed Zambian company, to show that 
regulation is difficult and enforcement is equally difficult regardless of whether an 
FDI or a local company is involved.  
3.5.3 Dealing with a Local Enterprise: The Case of Zambeef 
	  
A locally-based company provides an example to show that the challenges of 
enforceability and regulation of corporate governance are not confined to foreign 
direct investors; on the contrary, the challenges apply ‘across the board.’ 
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A Meaty Scandal  
During 2013, meat scandals were unearthed in different parts of the world. 
While Europe was coming to terms with horse meat being displayed as beef on the 
shelves,72 Zambia was dealing with accusations that Zambia’s leading meat producer, 
Zambeef, had sold meat containing unacceptable quantities of the chemical 
Formaldehyde (aromatic aldehyde) in the meat.73  This chemical is generally used for 
preservation, but is ‘not for human consumption’74 as stipulated by the Zambian 
minister of health at the time, Dr. Kasonde. It is also used in embalming human 
corpses for preservation. It should be understood that Zambeef was actually reluctant 
to admit to these accusations despite the widespread media frenzy, both on social and 
print media, that reported the issue. An operational update on their website during the 
scandal indicated that they would wait until confirmation through the laboratory test 
results.75 There appeared to be a criminal breach of the law through the abrogation of 
the Zambian Public Health Act Cap 295 and the Food and Drugs Act Cap 303. The 
question now arises: what does this have to do with corporate governance? 
 
Corporate governance as defined in Section I of this paper is a ‘system of 
checks and balances, to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory obligations, a 
risk management process, accountability to stakeholders.’76 Therefore the principles 
of corporate governance apply to health, food and safety, responsible investing, and 
accountability to the community: the meat consumers in this case. Those principles 
also apply to the creditors and employees who may suffer by virtue of management’s 
decisions if those decisions lead to a loss of jobs and revenue attributable to 
diminished trust and transparency by the market. Therefore, from this point of view, 
the Zambeef meat scandal did not just break the legal rules but also broke corporate 
governance principles, despite Zambeef being a listed company on the LuSE stock 
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market and the London Stock exchange; its listing requirements stipulated that 
businesses and companies must follow the corporate governance guidelines. 
 
The challenge with local business, particularly in Zambia, is that of regulation. 
This applies even though the relevant rules and standards have been set: this is 
evident from the previous example of the behaviour of a listed company. One can 
only imagine the extent to which non-listed companies are not aware of what is 
expected of them. Also, these corporate governance principles are not a mandatory 
requirement unless companies freely choose to apply them, and this poses the main 
challenge. Regulating essential principles without the authority to require compliance 
and the means to ensure enforcement by business clearly illustrate a toothless 
mechanism that cannot help regulation and promotion of corporate governance. It is 
from this perspective, using Zambeef’s meat scandal as an example, that the weakness 
of enforcement of corporate governance in Zambia can be seen.	  
	  
4 CONCLUSION 
To summarise: the examples of FDIs on the continent and in Zambia in particular, as 
well the examples of local businesses, show clearly that the challenges of promoting 
corporate governance lie in improving the current toothless mechanisms of 
enforcement and regulation; these mechanisms need to be revisited.  
 
Recommendations and suggestions on how to strengthen these mechanisms 
are discussed in section V of this paper. 
  
	  






SECTION IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
COMPLIANCE (REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT) 
APPROACHES TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The issue of compliance in corporate governance ‘is a significant issue, not always 
afforded the significance it deserves.’77  It is fundamental as non-compliance makes 
the whole notion of governance ineffective and pointless. There are different 
approaches towards fostering compliance; ‘apply or explain,’ ‘comply or else’ or the 
‘comply or explain’ approach. An examination of these approaches is of great 
importance as this is one way of finding the most effective one; a method of 
comparative analysis is applied.  
It is apparent that all three approaches have been tried and tested in different 
countries; for example, the United States of America’s approach is ‘comply or else’  
with the threat of legal sanctions for non-compliance.78  The United Kingdom (UK) 
uses ‘comply or explain’ and South Africa uses ‘apply or else.’ The fact that each of 
these countries can generally boast of overall positive compliance rates leads one to 
conclude that the effectiveness of these approaches is relative and specific to the 
business environment in which they are enforced. In order to illustrate this, this paper 
begins with an introduction to the South African approach of ‘apply or explain’ and 
looks at the historical evolution behind this approach. Secondly, a method of 
comparative analysis is used to assess the effectiveness of the South African approach 
and the American and UK approaches are contrasted and compared. By doing so, the 
strengths, weaknesses, similarities and differences of each approach are highlighted.  
Thirdly, this paper will draw on the principles of responsible leadership 
outlined in the corporate governance case, SABC Ltd v Mpofu [2009] and the 
importance of participation of all stakeholders in addition to the preferred mandatory 
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approach. These two factors are essential for the effectiveness of the n’importe 
quelle79 approach. 
4.2. SOUTH AFRICA 
4.2.1 ‘Apply or Explain’ 
South Africa’s current approach towards ensuring compliance with corporate 
governance principles is that of ‘apply or explain,’ which has evolved from ‘comply 
or explain.’ The different approaches might appear to be a game of semantics but they 
are the outcome of a great deal of debate. In order to understand the choice behind 
this ‘apply or explain’ approach, one must look backwards briefly at the evolution of 
South Africa’s Corporate Governance Codes.  Following the formation of the first 
South African Institute of Directors (IODSA), the first King Code (King I) was 
formed in 1994 followed by King II in 2001. The period between 2008 and 2009 
brought about many changes to the world of financial and business regulation and the 
South African Companies Act 71, coincidentally, was also being reviewed at that 
time. IODSA revised its Corporate Governance Code, releasing the latest, King III 
(2009) which was highly influenced by these events. Firstly, King III was compatible 
with the New Companies Act and was drafted with that Act in mind. It was also seen 
as a way of putting new regulatory measures in place in an effort to avoid another 
financial crisis like the one of 2008. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
produced new mandatory listing requirements80 that included the compulsory 
application of King III. Another significant change was that King III adopted a wider 
approach in terms of application. This background sheds some light on the evolution 
from ‘comply or explain’ to ‘apply or explain.’  
This ‘apply or explain’ approach is principally driven by recommendations, 
which can also be referred to as ‘soft laws,’ rather than hard, mandatory, statute-based 
laws. The approach is also supported by former ESKOM chair, Reuel Khoza, who 
states that ‘self-governance is more effective than imposition that is instigated by 
law.’ Furthermore, one can argue that some of the strengths of that approach are as 
follows: those who apply the principles are more engaged and comfortable with 
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compliance because ‘if it [the board] believes it is in the best interests of the 
company, to override a recommended practice’81 it can do so provided it has an 
explanation; this is in contrast to having a ‘mindless response to corporate 
governance,’82 or a ‘tick box mentality’ that is most likely to manifest in a ‘comply or 
explain’ or ‘comply or else’ approach. Furthermore, it is also believed that the 
flexibility provided by this approach fosters innovation, creativity and risk taking, 
which are necessities in the business world, as opposed to the rigid rules of mandatory 
compliance. 
Nevertheless, King III still stipulates the importance of the law in terms of 
ensuring effective compliance, by stating that ‘good governance is not something that 
exists separately from the law and it is entirely unnecessary to unhinge governance 
from the law.’83 This statement leads to the debate about the point of having corporate 
governance codes rather than mandatory laws. After all, laws may be more effective 
in achieving good corporate governance because legal sanctions can accompany any 
default with no excuses or explanations accepted: comply or else!  Despite South 
Africa’s corporate governance system of ‘apply or explain’ being an internationally 
acclaimed one, it has a weakness. Thus, it lacks sufficient ‘teeth’ to ensure 
implementation, enforcement and compliance. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), alone, is not sufficient, since its mandate only applies to listed companies. 
However, one should not rule out the prospects of success of a self-regulatory system 
when there is a similar system in the UK that also relies on the market, financial 
regulatory bodies, and the London Stock Exchange (LSE); this system is working 
fairly well as will be shown in the succeeding paragraphs.  
By using a method of comparative analysis, the second part of this section will 
assess the effectiveness of the South African approach, compared with the UK and 
American approaches. This will show the strengths, weaknesses, similarities and 
differences of each approach. 
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4.3. UNITED KINGDOM 
4.3.1 ‘Comply or Explain’ 
The United Kingdom applies its corporate governance principles using a ‘comply or 
explain’ approach. South Africa and the UK may be similar in the sense that both 
their approaches are based on self-regulation and therefore compliance is largely left 
to the market to regulate. However, it could be argued that the self-regulatory 
environments in which South African and British businesses and companies operate 
do differ from each other. The UK has more than just a stock exchange (LSE) to 
implement and ensure compliance with corporate governance principles; this is unlike 
South Africa, which heavily relies on the JSE. Other external independent regulatory 
bodies such as the Financial Reporting Council, Financial Services Agency (FSA) and 
the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) provide muscle because compliance or application 
reports are required by these institutions as well: failure to do this results in penalties.  
Recent research from the University of Newcastle’s ‘flower eye test’ suggests 
that ‘people behave differently when they are being watched… [it] affect[s] people’s 
tendency for social co-operation in a real-life setting.’84 Such observations support the 
argument that people applying the principles of corporate governance are more likely 
to co-operate and comply under mandatory laws or closely supervised self-regulation 
mechanisms, when institutions are in place like those in the United Kingdom. This 
arrangement is better suited for the UK and perhaps for South Africa, to a certain 
extent, if it had to strengthen its regulatory institutional capacity. This situation would 
probably apply in most African countries, where economies are rampant with high 
levels of corruption and are far from being able to let the market regulate itself. Here, 
one can recall the point, made previously, that the effectiveness of these approaches is 
relative and depends on the various factors in the specific business environment. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to look at the benefits and disadvantages of each approach. 
Thus, the ‘comply or explain’ approach, in common with South Africa’s ‘apply or 
explain’ provides for a great deal of flexibility in terms of responding quickly to 
crises and events, rather than having to wait for a bill to be passed in parliament to 
become a statute and thus enforceable.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Newcastle University, ‘‘Big Brother” eyes encourage honesty, study shows,’ 27 June 2006 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2006-06/uonu-be062606.php <accessed 15 February 2016> 
	  







4.4. UNITES STATES OF AMERICA 
4.4.1 ‘Comply or else’ 
The United States of America applies the ‘comply or else’ approach, which provides 
clear laws and guidelines that can be enforced by legal sanctions that accompany 
these laws. It is accepted that there is much scope for flexibility and freedom in self-
regulation; however, it could be argued that the effectiveness of the notion of self-
regulation is overrated and puts so much faith in the idea of the corporate citizen a 
topic of great debate.  
Mervyn King, the doyen of South African corporate governance seems to have 
great faith in the intrinsic goodness of people, because believes that laws are not 
needed per se. Thus, he writes in Transient Care Takers: ‘regulators need pass no law 
other than each company has to explain its conduct with regard to corporate social 
responsibility.’85  It is accepted that there are many genuine people and companies 
with good intentions in the world. However, the opposite is also true especially in the 
world of business where a company’s growth usually depends on getting ahead of 
others. This competition and drive to get ahead and make substantial returns and 
profits will probably provide the setting for creative excuses and explanations in the 
‘comply or explain’ and ‘apply or explain’ approaches; this makes any system based 
on those approaches ineffective and therefore pointless.  
Legislators should consider prioritising issues of corporate governance in 
order to speed up the response time to events and possible crises; this will provide for 
flexibility that self-regulation encompasses. The ‘comply or else’ model, in this 
writer’s opinion, would be the better option for most developing countries in Africa, 
at least at the outset; it could perhaps gradually develop into a self-regulatory system 
when the business environment in those countries is mature enough to withstand at 
least three quarters of the current corruption levels. Without this transformation, 
‘comply or else’ would be the preferred and most effective choice. 
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4.5. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 
The OECD provides a global, international benchmark for corporate governance. This 
can be used as a guide by countries, helping them to draw up their own governance 
systems, taking into account the unique characteristics of the business environment of 
each particular country. The OECD guidelines are often referred to as the hybrid 
model as the OECD created a corporate governance model that can be implemented in 
different formats and regions of the world but with a specific mission: to promote 
corporate governance. The OECD emphasises the need for corporate governance 
codes and guides to be consistent with the rule of law in order to be effective. 
 
Although the OECD has produced various guidelines on the topic of corporate 
governance, this section examines the question of whether ascertaining accountability 
of various institutions should be done through the ‘comply or explain’ or ‘apply or 
explain’ mechanism. This is followed by an evaluation of what would need to be done 
to ensure compliance by institutions that are government owned.  
4.6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of corporate governance is ‘to ascertain or assist directors on whether 
they have discharged their duties.’86 Therefore, the effectiveness of any of the ‘apply 
or explain,’ ‘comply or explain’ or ‘comply or else’ approaches rests on the principle 
of responsible leadership. Applying or complying with principles of corporate 
governance requires responsible leadership. This issue is clearly described in the case 
of SABC Ltd v Mpofu [2009] as leadership, which is ‘characterised by ethical values 
of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency which values underpin 
good corporate governance.’87   The introduction of more legislation in the absence of 
responsible leadership will not help the advancement of ethical values; this was 
pointed out in SABC v Mpofu [2009]. However, participation by all stakeholders 
would promote better effectiveness of all these approaches. For example, the passive 
shareholders could clearly stipulate to the institutional funders that they should invest 
their money in companies or businesses that uphold sustainability and corporate 
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governance principles. This would indirectly influence the boards and management of 
these companies to run their businesses in a sustainable and accountable manner in 
order to build credibility to attract investors. In addition, employees and the 
community at large need to build a strong civil society to demand responsible 
investing and responsible leadership. In the Conclusion of this report it will be 
recommended that all stakeholders be incorporated into the Lusaka Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Code.  
  
	  




SECTION V: CONCLUSION 
In conclusion: it is clear that the preferred approach would be that of ‘comply or else’ 
but in conjunction with participation of all stakeholders: these include the passive 
shareholders, the board, management, employees and the community. All of these 
need to be governed by responsible leadership. However, this paper has also shown 
the complexities of evaluating the effectiveness of the different approaches of ‘apply 
or explain,’ ‘comply or explain’ and ‘comply or else,’ in order to ensure compliance. 
Thus, each of these approaches has to be evaluated within the context of the specific 
country or jurisdiction; it is evident that one approach may work well in one country 
but may not necessarily be effective in another.  
5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ZAMBIA 
The notion of stakeholder inclusivity has been part of the global evolution of 
corporate governance. ‘Stakeholder inclusivity’ is a term describing a broader and 
more inclusive process of communication between a company and those potentially 
affected by it. The current view is changing from just looking at shareholders as the 
only and or main stakeholders; instead, a broader perspective is applied that includes 
employees, trade unions, consumers, financial institutions, suppliers and 
communities. Zambia and other African countries developing their corporate 
governance structures need to recognise the importance of the stakeholder inclusivity 
approach. In particular, the various stakeholders need specific reassurances and 
accountability frameworks; for example, concerning  job safety (e.g. employees), 
financial reporting (creditors) and environmental issues (consumers/ the community). 
5.1.1 Where we are now 
At present, the notion of stakeholder inclusivity is accompanied with much 
oversimplification in Zambia because there is still a slight disconnect between the 
theory and the reality. Companies are under pressure from shareholders to maximise 
returns on investment capital but at the same time shareholders feel their rights are 
being eroded at the cost of competing claims of other stakeholders concerning issues 
of the environment, sustainability, and the like. The debate can become heated 
because the cost of compliance is of great significance, which in itself is an issue. 
	  






This is the argument that people in decision-making positions put forward to explain 
why stakeholder inclusivity does not necessarily appeal to them. Thus: 
 The first challenge involves identifying exactly who the stakeholders 
are, developing policy on how they should be engaged – and how you 
report back. The reality is that the shareholders still own the company 
and they want a return on their capital, but not at any price.88  
Nonetheless, the future looks bright. 
5.1.2. The need for Stakeholder Inclusivity 
It is clear that there is a need for a stakeholder inclusive approach; after all, it is not a 
good approach to have a narrow focus on just marginal profits and nothing else. The 
business world is part of society as a whole and therefore the way in which a 
company or business operates has to take into consideration other factors such as 
ESGs (Environmental, Social and Governance issues). One can cite many examples 
of companies that did not do this; for example, the 2010 Deep-water Horizon oil spill 
popularly referred to as Gulf of Mexico BP oil spill,89 the effects of which will be felt 
for many decades to come not only on the marine life but on the shareholders, 
community and environment around that area. Another example is that of the global 
financial crisis. There is enough evidence to show that the need for corporate 
governance and stakeholder consideration and inclusivity is of paramount importance 
in order to avoid such calamities.  Shareholders should therefore be asking their 
company directors the right questions and should be ensuring that the right checks, 
balances and precautions have been put in place to avoid such mishaps. Ignoring a 
broader stakeholder approach could lead a company into a disaster that could even 
cause a global crisis: the global financial crisis of 2008 illustrates this. It is therefore 
evident that there is an over-riding need for a stakeholder inclusivity approach. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Wilkinson, 2012, echoed these sentiments and expressed the challenges in changing the mind-sets of 
boards in order to take stakeholder issues into account. 
89 The Guardian Newspaper reports that British Petroleum (BP) continued to make a $6.3bn 
quarterly loss between 2010 and July 2015, showing the continued effects not only on the environment 
but also on the creditors (shareholders) [http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/28/bp-loss-
deepwater-horizon-bill ] and the employees who still suffer job losses five years after to this disaster  
[ http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/02/bp-annual-loss-biggest-for-20-years-axes-
thousands-of-jobs-deepwater ].  
 
	  




5.1.3. The need for a revision of the current Zambian Companies Act 
In order to strengthen the regulation and enforcement of corporate governance in 
Zambia, there is an urgent need to review the Companies Act. This is an out-dated 
Act although it may still be useful in many ways. Nevertheless it needs to be updated 
to respond to the modern developments in the corporate world and particularly in the 
area of corporate governance today; the update would need to take into consideration 
the different facets of compliance such as respect for the environment, social 
implications as well as financial creditors, amongst others.  Reviewing the Act should 
ensure that it becomes one of the instruments available for effective enforcement and 
regulation, within the ambit of the rule of law. Every institution would have to abide 
by it, and failure to do so would cause repercussions as defined for that specific 
breach. In addition to the revised Act, other forms of soft laws can be recommended 
as a mechanism of fostering the approach of ‘comply or else’ for maximum 
compliance.  
Proposal to Introduce soft laws as a support to the Zambian Companies Act Cap 
388 to ensure compliance  
	  
One could argue that the elements of corporate governance elements are not 
all addressed in one single Act; instead, they are covered, often individually, in 
different pieces of legislation. In any case, there is not necessarily a need for new laws 
to ensure compliance; instead there is a need for enforcement of existing laws. Indeed, 
compliance is the main problem, which is why it is a topical point of discussion today 
on the subject of corporate governance enforceability.  
 
The proceeding section strongly advocated for stringent consequences, laid 
down by the law, to ensure compliance; however this may not be the only approach. 
There are various ways of promoting enforceability of corporate governance 
principles and the regulation of this enforcement. This section presents some 
proposals to this effect and in no particular order the following will be discussed as 
recommendations: integrated reporting in Zambia, stakeholder inclusivity, responsible 
investing and the general need for the revision and update of the Zambian Companies 
Act.  
	  






5.1.4. The need to introduce, support and promote the concept of integrated 
reporting in Zambia 
 “Corporate reporting as we’ve been doing it for the last decade is no longer fit for 
purpose90” (King, 2012a) 
Having discussed the need for stakeholder inclusivity and revision as the first and 
second recommendations, as a third recommendation, the concept of integrated 
reporting should be introduced, supported and promoted by Zambian institutions in 
charge of corporate governance. This concept encompasses a holistic structure of how 
business strategy should be approached today. Countries such as South Africa have 
played a leading role in establishing the concept of integrated reporting and this has 
led to a major change in corporate reporting in South Africa; institutions are now 
being more responsible and accountable both in the public and private sector.  
In order to understand the need for integrated reporting in Zambia one needs 
to consider the International Integrated Reporting Council, as a guide to how this 
recommendation could benefit corporate governance in Zambia. Subsequent to the 
2009 King III Report, the Integrated Reporting Council of South Africa was formed 
in May 2010. This was followed by the International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC), which was established by a team led by the South African doyen of corporate 
governance, Professor Mervyn King in July 2010.The IIRC is still known as the 
global authority on integrated reporting and its mission is to include integrated 
reporting in mainstream business practice in the public and private sectors. This 
mission consequently led to the release of the guideline document titled ‘Integrated 
Reporting <IR>Framework (FW)’ in December 201391 as a way of changing the way 
business and reporting is done. It represents a transition from the past, which focused 
on financials, to the present focusing more on the operations of a business as a model, 
which is more aware of the none financial, issues surrounding the company and how 
the business can be kept more sustainable.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Mervyn King in a key speech at a high-level meeting of investors hosted by Prince Charles at St 
James’ Palace in 2009 
91The International Integrated Reporting Council, December 2013, ‘The International Framework,’ 
IIRC, Ch. 3., 16 
	  




In summary, IR Frameworks serve as guides as far as the ‘triple bottom line’ 
(Environment, Social and Governance) issues are concerned. These Frameworks 
show how to take these issues into account: people involved in the business strategy 
of a company synchronise all facets of an organisation together with the financial 
aspects of reporting. The concept of integrated reporting therefore addresses the 
integration of strategy, sustainability and governance92. Bob Garratt makes reference 
to Henry Mintzberg’s model as illustrated in an image in his book, ‘The fish rots from 
the head: Developing effective boards,’93 explaining this concept well. Thus, as part 
of integrated thinking, integrated reporting should be able to see ahead, behind, 
above, below, beyond, beside and finally see through it all (refer to Fig.3 below). 
Basically, seeing strategy holistically involves taking into account all the stakeholders 
involved, and those affected by the business, when thinking, planning and being 
accountable in reporting.  
94Fig.3. Strategic thinking as ‘Seeing:’ Henry Mintzberg 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Institute of Directors Southern Africa, July 2013, KPMG, Audit Committee Forum, ‘Integrated 
Reporting: gathering momentum and taking shape’ 
93 Garrat. B, 2010, ‘The fish rots from the head: Developing effective boards,’ 3rd edition, Profile Books 
94 ibid 63 
	  






Against this background, the introduction of integrated reporting is highly 
recommended as a way of ensuring enforcement and regulation of corporate 
governance. With the increase in the number of FDIs entering the business space in 
Zambia and Africa as a whole, the governing authorities need to demand that 
integrated reporting is paramount in the requirements of corporate governance 
principles. This will help to promote effective regulation by ensuring that companies 
think through their business strategies from inception to completion. Companies must 
not only look at how the strategies will make them more money; they must also look 
at what impact (positive or negative) their operations have on the community they 
operate in and how they can plan for this. Chapter 9 of King III, which lays out the 
practice notes for integrated reporting, explains the primary source of integrated 
reporting as follows: 
To explain to providers of financial capital how an organisation creates 
value over time. In other words, when deciding on what gets included 
in a report it is what substantively affects the organisation’s ability to 
create value over time; with the providers of financial capital serving as 
a “filter” of information. The FW states that this report benefits all 
stakeholders interested in an organisation’s ability to create value over 
time.95 
Professor Mervyn King’s quote at the opening of this section 5.1.4 goes on to 
emphasise that the previous reporting focus on financials was ‘no longer fit for 
purpose’96 and companies needed to take a broader look at their responsibilities and at 
being effective, by responding to issues in their integrated reports as part of their 
strategies. Once this viewpoint is introduced and adopted in Zambia, Zambian 
corporate governance will create integrated performance and thinking. However one 
prerequisite is to establish a policy requiring companies to submit holistic overviews 
of their operations explaining how these operations are sustainable and add value to 
the benefit of all stakeholders. The OECD’s 2014 background paper for the 30th 
Round Table Report on Sustainable Development summarises what is meant by 
‘integrated thinking’ as follows: 
 The active consideration by an organization of the relationships 
between its various operating and functional units and the capitals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 King III, 2014, ‘Practice Notes,’ Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 3 
96 ibid 71 
	  




that the organization uses and affects. Integrated thinking leads to 
integrated decision-making and actions that consider the creation of 
value over the short, medium and long term.97 
Integrated reporting seems to be a good way of ensuring that companies are 
law abiding and that they implement good corporate governance; however, it poses 
challenges. The subsequent sections will highlight some of these challenges in 
integrated reporting,  in no particular order: additional responsibilities; greater 
liabilities on directors; and, challenges in choosing the right sectors to report on. 
Challenges of Integrated Reporting I: Additional responsibilities 
Integrated reporting imposes additional responsibilities that call for integrated 
thinking, reporting and stakeholder engagement. Annual reports need to include this 
information and are therefore more bulky than previous ones. The problem arises in 
trying to ascertain whether anybody actually reads, word-for-word, the 400 page plus 
documents produced today in the name of integrated reporting reports. In view of this, 
would a follow-through recommended process actually take effect as far as the 
primary purpose of integrated reporting goes?  
Challenges of Integrated Reporting II: Greater liability on the shoulders of 
Directors  
One could argue that another challenge of fostering enforcement of corporate 
governance, through the introduction of integrated reporting, would be that of the 
increase in liability of directors.  It is widely felt that liability cover for directors 
should not increase. One counter argument is that if directors plan their roles properly, 
then the management risks would decrease, both for individual directors and the 
organisation as a whole; therefore there should be no need to worry about added 
liability.	  
Challenges of Integrated Reporting III: Choosing the right issues to report on  
One of the key challenges surrounding integrated reporting is that of the 
bulkiness of integrated reporting, particularly the issue of losing focus on being 
concise in reports. This could eventually lead back to a ‘tick box approach’ that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Baron. R, 2014, Background paper for the 30th Round Table on Sustainable Development, ‘The 
Evolution of Corporate Reporting for Integrated Performance,’ OECD, 7 
 
	  






should be avoided in corporate reporting. The South African Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), Mxolisi Nxasana argues that integrated reporting could actually 
be less effective if useful information is lost in a mass of detail. At the same time, it is 
important not to lose sight of the purpose of the document.  Zambia and the Lusaka 
Stock exchange (LuSE) in particular, should keep in mind during the review of the 
corporate governance code that an integrated report needs to be concise and focus on 
its primary audience: the investors. Only by doing so will it achieve its purpose of 
fostering effective enforcement and regulation of corporate governance requisites. 
 
The benefits of integrated reporting greatly outweigh the challenges presented 
here. However these challenges have been outlined to keep them in mind in the event 
of possible queries that may arise during the presentation of the concept to corporates 
operating in the Zambian business sector.  
5.1.5. The Need to Advance Responsible Investing in Zambia 
Responsible Investing (RI) is an important and necessary mechanism for promoting 
sound governance principles and practices within companies because it holds 
directors and management accountable. Zambia needs to promote and encourage 
investors to invest responsibly. Responsible investing is a key governance driver and 
it has been referred to as the missing piece in the puzzle as far as South African 
corporate governance is concerned. Thus, the King Code does not provide an 
adequate platform to address issues of responsible investing, which have now been 
enshrined in a supplementary Code known as the Code for Responsible Investing in 
South Africa (CRISA). The LuSE Code should also add a similar provision for RI as 
it is a crucial element in ensuring compliance and the success of corporate 
governance. This addition will provide guidance to investors who may need to ask 
businesses and companies key questions on their ESG principles and policies, as well 
as risks, before injecting in their money. This will ensure that long-term investments 
are sustainable, bearing in mind that large sums of capital are injected and put at risk.  
Doing away with Passive Investors 
Engaging investors to help in the enforcement of corporate governance 
practices is another way of ensuring the advancement of these practices in the 
corporate world. The concern is that there is not enough being done to attribute 
	  




responsibility and accountability to people conducting business transactions. There is 
also a need to ensure transparency in dealings. This situation has led to the United 
Nations launching country guidelines on responsible investing, known as Principles of 
Responsible Investing (UN PRI). The UN PRI focuses on promoting six principles of 
responsible investing centred on environmental, social and governance issues on the 
premise of advancing corporate governance. The goal of the UN PRI is ‘to understand 
the implications of sustainability for investors and support signatories to incorporate 
these issues into their investment decision making and ownership practices.’98  
Zambia would do well to be guided by these policy guidelines and to adapt them to 
the business environment of the country. This would help ensure that capital injectors 
(investors) are well aware of their responsibilities as well as the powers they have at 
their disposal to become active owners of capital and companies, by widening the 
focus of investing to include not only profits but also the wider picture of corporate 
governance.   
Sustainability 
One of the recommendations aimed at strengthening regulation and 
enforcement is that directors with fiduciary duties should not only act with an 
economic lens but should also bear in mind issues of sustainability and the 
environment in which they operate. Capital providers such as institutional investors 
can demand this because as a society we need to be aware of unpriced externalities on 
our planet. For example, the energy and chemical company, SASOL, is the biggest 
single emitter of carbon dioxide in the world.99 How does one put a price on such an 
externality?  The British Liberal Democratic politician and Business Secretary, Vince 
Cable eloquently posed the question ‘are the markets working in the long term 
benefits of the people?’100 Institutional investors, and all investors in general, need to 
be engaged on the issue of responsible investing. Thus, business plans must take into 
consideration the long-term effect of business conduct as opposed to thinking of gain 
in the short-term. Short-term gains could include, say, a doubling of profits, but 
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2016.  
99 Ashton Glenn, ‘Johannesburg's appalling air quality: We can't let SASOL and ESKOM off the 
Hook,” The South African Civil Society Information Service, 19 August 2014 
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without realising the impact this has on the earth, especially in African countries. It is 
believed that the next major population increase will be in emerging markets: the 
world currently has a population of over 7 billion101 people, in comparison with the 
end of 2nd World War in 1945, when the global population was 2.6 billion people. 
These figures speak for themselves and cannot be ignored; they underline the need for 
sustainable practices to be strongly emphasised in corporate governance, by changing 
the way business strategies are implemented.  
5.2. CONCLUSION 
The way forward can be summarised in five basic points. Firstly, Zambia must 
improve its systems of corporate governance, accountability and transparency to 
ensure effective enforcement and regulatory results. Incorporating the reviews and 
recommendations made throughout this dissertation and taking note of the setbacks 
and limitations that weaken proper regulation and enforcement of corporate 
governance would be a sound starting point.  
 
Secondly, the Zambian corporate governance Code (the LuSE Code) should 
strengthen its position by attending to the points raised in section III of this thesis: 
Law and Practice of Corporate Governance in Zambia. Thus, the Code needs to be 
stricter and also needs to find a way to provide special provisions for the inclusion of 
small- and medium-sized local and foreign businesses (e.g. Chinese businesses) to 
participate and be held accountable over their corporate governance principles. 
 
Thirdly, Zambia and other African countries need generally to strengthen their 
legal and corporate governance environment by fighting corruption and upholding the 
rule of law while giving regulatory institutions and agencies the independence to 
perform. Without this, the aim of good business practices and corporate governance 
will not be achieved on the African continent: this represents a challenge. In Zambia, 
in particular, this issue urgently highlights the need for the revision and expansion of 
corporate governance provisions in the Zambian Companies Act. It also highlights the 
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need to continue using the IoDZ as an advocate and promoter of corporate governance 
principles in the country. 
Furthermore, the institutions and organs responsible for ensuring compliance 
of corporate governance principles need to promote the style of integrated reporting 
as an indirect check system to ensure corporations are abiding by the requirements by 
reporting on their activities in a concatenated manner.  
Last but not least, a call for responsible investing is a key factor to ensure 
enforcement of corporate governance. This will ensure that the financial investments 
in companies are interlinked with the sustainability of the activities undertaken by the 
companies. Responsible investment by way of taking into consideration the short, 
medium term and long-term impact and effects of investments would positively 
contribute to ensuring effective regulation and enforcement of corporate governance. 
 
In conclusion: this paper has set out the challenges of enforcing corporate 
governance principles in Zambia and at the same time offered solutions by laying out 
recommendations and how best to overcome these challenges as a prescription to the 
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